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LEMKOS AND THEIR RELIGIOUS CULTURE IN WESTERN AREAS OF POLAND

Marek J. BATTEK[1]
Joanna SZCZEPANKIEWICZ-BATTEK[2]

Abstract: *After finishing 2nd Word War in Lower Silesia territory happened the total exchange of the population. On Germans place, both Catholics and Protestants (Jews were exterminated by Nazis earlier), the Polish population, mostly catholic, flowed in, and also Jews group remaining from the Holocaust. After two years arrived numerous group Lemkos (Rusins). Traditionally Lemkos are the greek-catholic confession, however the part of them before the 2nd world war passed on Orthodox Church. Settlement of this ethnic group on the west of the Poland, where the confessor of churches orthodox and greek-catholic few so far, altered considerably religious relations in this region.*
Lemkos is the population living the south-east Poland and east Slovakia (in Slovakia called Rusins). After 2nd world war they together with Ukrainians were the victims of very brutal displacements (Action code name "Vistula"). This had on the aim cutting off the subsidiaries for underground army fighting about the independence of Ukraine. From among 50 thousands Lemkos the majority was estate in years 1947–1948 in west part of Poland, mostly between Legnica and Zielona Góra. This population was in majority poor and the faintly educated. After displacement many Lemkos changes confessions to orthodox church. Now in Lower Silesia live about 30 thousands Lemkos, fifty-fifty orthodox and greek-catholics. After political changes in 1989 part of Lemkos returned to the motherland, in Beskidy Mts. The largest centres of the Lemkos culture in Lower Silesia are Legnica and Przemków.
Key words: *Lemkos, Eastern Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Lower Silesia, Lubusz Land*

THE ORIGIN OF LEMKOS AND THEIR HISTORY UNTIL 1945

Lemkos are an ethnic group that until 1947 inhabited the Sącz Beskid and the Low Beskid mountain ranges – a land in the Polish-Slovak borderland. In their own language this area is referred to as Lemkovyna (Łemkowszczyzna in Polish). They are an indigenous group – the westernmost branch of Rusyn people (Misiak 2006), but formed from a variety of cultural elements (Olszański, 1988). There are several theories about the origin of Lemkos. Ukrainian scholars regard them as a residual population of Rusyn people settling the Carpathians. Polish scholars, on the other hand, consider Lemkos to be a group of Poles who in the 14th and 15th centuries merged with Vlach settlers, arriving in large numbers in

1 **Mgr inż. Marek J. Battek,**
Wrocław University of Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland; e-mail: marek@silez.pl.
2 **Dr Joanna Szczepankiewicz-Battek,**
The Witelo University of Applied Science in Legnica, Faculty of Pedagogics, Touristic and Recreation, ul. Sejmowa 5a, 59-220 Legnica, Poland; e-mail: joanna@silez.pl.

these lands between the 14th and the 16th century (Kowalczyk, 2009). The Lemko culture contains Polish, Slovak, Rusyn and Vlach elements. The area of the Low Beskid was also inhabited by Romani and Jewish people, but both of these groups tended to isolate themselves from the remaining inhabitants of the region. Therefore, linking Lemkos with Jewish or Romani roots is unjustified. Lemkos themselves do not deny their connection with Carpathian Rusyns, although most of them renounce any links with Ukrainians. In spite of this, numerous politicians and some Polish scholars (Chałupczak, Browarek, 1998; Żerelik 2000) regard Lemkos as Ukrainian people, distinguished from other Ukrainians only by their dialect.

Linguists usually derive the proper name *Lemkos* from the Slovak word *lem* meaning *only,* which was used to refer to this group by other Rusyns (Misiak 2006). According to Reinfuss (1998), the word *Lemko* stood for 'someone who spoke bad Rusyn' and it entered common use in the second half of the 19th century. The Lemko language is a Rusyn dialect, although it contains far more Polish and Slovak elements than other Rusyn languages. It started to evolve in the 19th century, but its written from developed on a larger scale much later. In the 19th and the 20th centuries, Lemkovyna was one of the most neglected regions of Europe, both culturally and economically. Its inhabitants were occupied mainly with cattle grazing or, more rarely, farming. Many of them lived in abject poverty. There were almost no educated people, with the exception of clergymen, who were always highly respected by the inhabitants of Lemkowyna. This is also the reason why Lemkos often lacked national awareness. However, owing to their language and religion, they felt emotionally closer to Ukraine or Russia than to their Catholic neighbours. Starting from the late 19th century, numerous inhabitants of Galicia, including Lemkos, emigrated to North America for economic reasons. Today, in the USA and Canada there are still organizations uniting people with Lemko roots (Misiak 2006). Starting from the late 19th century, numerous Ukrainian agitators tried to convince Rusyn people (including Lemkos) to declare themselves Ukrainian. However, most Lemkos did not show any interest.

LEMKOS AND RELIGION

The religious situation of Lemkovyna was complicated. Settlers arriving there in the Middle Ages were usually members of the Orthodox Church. After the proclamation of the Union of Brześć (1596), the majority of the Carpathian population accepted it (or they were administratively incorporated into the Greek Catholic Church). However, part of the population stood by the Orthodox faith. At the time of the Austro-Hungarian rule (until 1918), the number of Greek Catholics in this territory became even higher. It was due to the fact that the Catholic Habsburgs clearly favoured Greek Catholics, while the Orthodox believers were discriminated or even persecuted. The icon of the Orthodox Lemkos' resistance to Catholic Austria was a young Orthodox clergyman from Żdynia – Maksym Sandowicz. In 1914 he was executed (without a court trial) by Austrian gendarmes in Gorlice, under the accusation of spying for of Russia. In 1994 he was canonised by the Polish Orthodox Church as the saint martyr Maksym Gorlicki (Rydzanicz 2008). In the period between the two world wars, the inter-religious relations in the region underwent big changes. In 1924, Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church was proclaimed (formerly, all Orthodox believers in Polish lands were formally dependent on Moscow Patriarchate). This church launched a massive campaign aimed at convincing Greek Catholics to

'return to the only true Church'. It achieved considerable success, as adherence to Greek Catholic religion was at that time increasingly associated with a declaration of Ukrainian nationality. As a result, just before the outbreak of World War II, approximately half of all Lemkos declared themselves Orthodox, and the other half – Greek Catholic. Because of poor education, most of them probably did not notice any difference between the doctrines or liturgies of these two churches. At the same time, most Greek-Catholic Ukrainians refused conversion to the Orthodox faith. The relationships between the members of both churches were tense from the very onset of Brześć Union and violent acts were not uncommon. Even today, members of both churches in Poland are still unfriendly towards each other, even though they often inhabit the same area.

OPERATION "VISTULA" AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

In September 1944, as a result of an agreement between PKWN (the interim Communist government of Poland) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a large number of Ukrainian and Rusyn people (including Lemkos) were forcibly relocated from Poland to Ukraine. In the period between the world wars, Ukrainians had opted explicitly for recognizing Lemkos as members of the Ukrainian nation (and they still uphold this stance). It is estimated that about 60–70% of the Lemko population were then forced to leave Poland (Misiak 2006). After the end of World War II, guerillas from Ukrainian Insurgent Army were still active in south-eastern Poland. They fought for independent Ukraine, but were also responsible for numerous crimes against Polish civilians. The most appalling murders were committed in Volhynia, where in August 1944 r. Ukrainian militants killed – according to various sources – between 20,000 and 150,000 Poles, often women and children. Even today this tragedy causes serious animosity between Polish and Ukrainian people.



Fig. 1. Directions of relocate Lemkos und Ukrainian population (authors own drawing)

In this situation, in 1947, Poland's Communist authorities decided to relocate all the Ukrainian population to northern and western Poland (fig. 1), in order to deprive the UIA of the support of local people. Lemkos also fell victim to these deportations, although most of them dissociated themselves completely from UIA activities (in Lemkovyna UIA did not operate almost at all). These resettlements (known as 'Operation code name "Vistula"') were extremely brutal. Even nowadays the victims remember them as an exceptionally traumatic ordeal. Operation Vistula has been the subject of a lot of historical research (including works of Żurko and Żerelik 2000, or Dudra S. 2008). The Lemko people were resettled as a whole to western Poland, to the territories which had been assigned to Poland by the Potsdam Conference and whose German population had been displaced. At first, the Germans were replaced by Polish soldiers returning from the frontline and settlers from the areas annexed by USSR during World War II. It is estimated that a total number of about 140,000 people were relocated during Operation "Vistula" (Dudra S. 2008). About 20,000 people, 70 per cent of whom were Lemkos, were deported to Lower Silesia. About 5,000 of these people adhered to the Orthodox Church, while the rest were Greek Catholics (Żerelik 2000). According to Misiak (2006), 4292 Lemko families were settled in Lower Silesia (18,804 people), 7819 people – in the Lubusz (Zielona Góra) Voivodeship (province), and several hundred people in each of the other provinces of northern and western Poland. The deportees were settled at least 30 km away from the state border and from province capitals. The largest numbers of settlers were sent to Legnica, Szprotawa and Strzelce Krajeńskie counties. During the deportations, Lemkos were treated by the authorities as brutally as Ukrainians. The only difference was that Lemkos were rarely classified as 'particularly dangerous' (this status was attributed to everybody who had been directly involved in UIA activities). Therefore, the rule of not settling more than 2 families in one locality did not apply to them as it did for Ukrainians. Lemkos formed larger groups, in some places they became the majority of residents. It was also relatively easier for them than for Ukrainians to obtain a permission to move to another place, e.g. to be closer to other relatives. However, it was a common practice to send Ukrainian and Lemko families to places previously settled by people coming from the areas where UIA had committed many crimes against Poles (e.g. from Volhynia). Consequently, Polish settlers often demonstrated enmity to Ukrainians, and they regarded Lemkos by Ukrainians too (Pudło 1987). Therefore, Lemkos usually concealed their national and especially religious identity from other people. The only positive aspect of Operation Vistula was the fact that the deportees obtained buildings and farms left by the displaced Germans as their new homes. Although they were usually the poorest farms in the villages (more attractive ones had already been taken), they represented a higher economic and cultural level than those left in Lemkovyna. In the late 1950s, rich deposits of copper ores were discovered in Lower Silesian areas inhabited by large groups of Lemkos. The newly-founded copper plant (mines in Lubin and Polkowice and foundries in Legnica and Głogów) provided well-paid jobs for many members of this ethnic group. During the approximate 20 years of their stay in the new places of residence, the majority of Lemkos had assimilated culturally into Lower Silesian society and stopped evoking negative emotions in most of their neighbours. However, Lemkos were still reluctant to reveal their national and religious identity, as diversity was not considered a value in the totalitarian Communist state – to the contrary, cases of minority discrimination were widespread, in spite of official declarations. In 1957

a secondary school providing Ukrainian medium education was opened in Złotoryja, in 1960 it was transferred to Legnica. Until the 1990s, it was the only school in Poland where maturity exam (equivalent to A-level) could be taken in Ukrainian. However, most of its pupils were native Ukrainians, often coming from very remote parts of Poland. Lemkos were reluctant to send their children to that school, fearing that studying there could result in their Ukrainization.

RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN THE NEW PLACE OF LIVING

Resettlements further complicated religious relations in Eastern Rite churches in Poland. In 1946, in compliance with the decision taken under the pressure of the USSR by so-called Lwów council, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was administratively incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church (Czech 2009). Also, the Byzantine-Ukrainian Church in Poland was meant to be altogether dissolved. Numerous Ukrainian and Lemko activists and members of the intelligentsia, including Greek Catholic and Orthodox priests, were sent to prison or the infamous concentration camp in Jaworzno (Misiak 2006). They were usually accused of 'nationalism' and often also of 'aiming at overturning the socialist system' or 'violating national borders'. Most of them were not released until 1956.

Immediately after the resettlements, the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church started building its structures in the new territory. Very often empty Lutheran churches were adopted for the needs of the Orthodox church (until 1945 most of the region's inhabitants were Lutheran). Members of the Orthodox church often met with negative reactions of the Catholic milieu, but their church was legal, unlike the Greek Catholic Church. Therefore, in the following years, lots of Lemkos deported to the western territories changed their religion to Orthodox so that they could perform religious practices without risking sanctions. Conversions to Roman Catholicism were also frequent. This usually pertained people who had married Catholics. The Byzantine-Ukrainian Church in Poland did not exist legally until 1958. The Vatican did not acknowledge Stalin's decision to dissolve it and obliged the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church to take care of Greek Catholic believers. However, as Czech proves it (2009), not all Roman Catholic hierarchs were friendly to Greek Catholics. In the areas whose population had been deported during Operation "Vistula", the Roman Catholic Church took over most churches of both rites, many of them were also vandalised or destroyed. In Lower Silesia, on the other hand, Roman Catholics often helped Greek Catholics, e.g. by letting them use their own churches for secret services. For many years, the main centre of Greek Catholic Lemkos' meetings in Lower Silesia was the RC st. Hyacinth church in Legnica. After 1958, state authorities stopped persecuting Greek Catholics, but the latter remained under the pressure of both RC and the Orthodox Church. The Byzantine-Ukrainian Church was not officially registered in Poland until 1989. On the all-Polish scale, the vast majority of its members are people of Ukrainian origin, although in the described area these are mostly Lemkos. Greek Catholic services are often held in RC churches (e.g. in Modła). However, in the recent years, Greek Catholics have received several churches for their own use (including St. James Church in Wrocław, which became the Greek Catholic cathedral) and have built a few new churches, e.g. in Legnica, Przemków or Zamienice. Currently, a church is being built in the village Patoka (Gromadka municipality), which is inhabited almost exclusively

by Lemkos. For many years, scholars occupied with the problem have agreed that Greek Catholic Lemkos are reluctant to integrate into the surrounding society and tend to isolate themselves. For instance, marriages with people from outside the Lemko community are normally disapproved of. Orthodox Lemkos, on the other hand, are much more willing to integrate into local communities, although they do not give up their religious and cultural identity.

Interesting material for research into inter-religious relations in the region could be collected by studying cemeteries. In Lower Silesia there are only two Orthodox cemeteries: in Zimna Woda (an old Lutheran cemetery taken over by the Orthodox, closed down in the 1960s) and Kębłów (still used). In other places, the deceased of all the three religions (also Roman Catholics) are buried on municipal cemeteries or RC parish cemeteries. The Orthodox and Greek Catholics usually have separate plots on them. Visually, Catholic, Orthodox and Greek Catholic graves found on these cemeteries have only minor differences. Although most Eastern Rite graves have an Orthodox cross and a Cyrillic inscription, it is not always the case. Moreover, year by year, an increasing number or graves show that mixed marriages are becoming more and more common. What is characteristic, the formerly tense relationships between Orthodox and Greek Catholic Lemkos have been 'thawing' in the recent years. A growing number of Lemko activist are declaring that both churches equally contribute to the preservation of Lemko culture and language. During the 'Lemko Watra' in Michałów in August 2009, a collection was carried out towards the rebuilding of a Greek Catholic church in a Lemkovyna village. The organisers asked the participants to support this initiative regardless of religious differences.

Currently, in the Western Territories of Poland there are over 20 Orthodox parishes operating within 5 deaneries. The vast majority of believers, particularly in the northern part of the Lower Silesian Voivodeship, the whole Lubusz Voivodeship and the southern part of the West Pomeranian Voivodeship, are Lemkos.

Orthodox parishes in the areas of Lemko resettlement:
Wrocław Deanery: Wrocław (2 parishes), Malczyce, Oleśnica, Wołów Stary, Żmigród, Samborz.
Lubin Deanery: Lubin, Głogów, Legnica, Michałów (Fig. 2), Rudna, Studzionki, Zimna Woda.
Zielona Góra Deanery: Zielona Góra, Buczyna (Fig. 3), Kożuchów, Leszno Górne, Lipiny, Przemków, Torzym, Słubice.
Szczecin Deanery: Barlinek, Brzoza, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Ługi.

a)  b) 

Fig. 2. Newly built Orthodox church in Michałów (a)
and the Operation "Vistula"commemorative board (b) (photo M. Battek)

Fig. 3. Orthodox (former protestant) church in Buczyna (photo M. Battek)

Greek Catholic Parishes:

Wrocław, Lubin, Chobienia, Sława, Oleśnica, Modła, Zamienice (Fig. 4), Wołów, Legnica, Środa Śląska, Zielona Góra, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Głogów, Międzyrzecz, Nowogród Bobrzański, Osiecko, Pożrzadło, Przemków, Skwierzyna, Strzelce Krajeńskie, Szprotawa.

Fig. 4. Newly built Greek Catholic church in Zamienice (b) (photo M. Battek)

It is very difficult to estimate the actual numbers of the members of both churches, as for many years they abstained from registering their believers for safety reasons, and some parishes still do not do that. The official statistics are often unreliable, as representatives of particular churches do not always provide true data, for a variety of reasons. Besides, the administrations of particular churches are generally very different from state administration, which also makes registration difficult. This is one of the problems that geographers of religion have to deal with in all Poland.



Fig. 5. Orthodox and Greek Catholic parishes in the areas of Lemko resettlement (authors own drawing)

LEMKOS IN POLAND AFTER 1989

In the late 1970s, the restrictive state policies towards Lemkos were relaxed. Numerous Lemko families moved to big cities, e.g. Wrocław and Lemko youth often went to university. In this way, Lemkos acquired their own intelligentsia. In the early 1980s and the 1990s, some Lemkos decided to return to their homeland. State authorities did not object, considering the causes of resettlements from 1947 a thing of the past. Most of

the returning Lemkos tried to recover their former land and make a living from farming (often eco-farming) or agrotourism. Lemkovyna is currently regarded as one of the most attractive regions in Poland. However, many farms in Lemkovyna had already belonged to Poles, and the lawsuits aimed at recovering them by the original owners are very arduous and not always successful. Many Lemkos returning to their homeland met with unfriendly reactions not only from their neighbours, but also local authorities. It is connected with the fact that for many years the political scene in the Subcarpathian Voivodeship has been dominated by right-wing parties, which are extremely unfriendly to national and religious minorities. For instance, in the recent months a large group of Polish inhabitants of the region (backed by local politicians) have opposed to attempts to introduce bilingual place names in Lemkovyna, although the law on national and ethnic minorities ensures this right to Lemkos (Smoleński, Kuraś 2009). In Lemkovyna there are Lemko organizations, e.g. the Lemko Union (since the 1990s having the reputation of being pro-Ukrainian) based in Gorlice or the *Ruska Bursa* Association, publishing the bimonthly magazine *Biesieda* (most articles are published in the Lemko language). Nevertheless, it could be estimated that 90% of Lemkos still live *na czużyni* (in exile).

State authorities for a long time negated ethnic distinctiveness of Lemkos, including them in the Ukrainian minority. In 1956, Lemkos and Ukrainians founded the common Ukrainian Socio-Cultural Association with a Lemko division. However, it did not foster the development of Lemko culture and literature, since these were Ukrainians who dominated the association's authorities, and they did not favour Lemko distinctiveness.

In 1989 the Lemko Association was founded in Legnica. Its aims include *uniting Lemko people regardless of their political and religious convictions (...), developing and popularizing their spiritual and material culture* (Statute of the Association). The best known cultural event organized by the Lemko Association is the festival *Łemkiwska Watra na Czużyni (Lemkos Campfire in Exil)* organized annually since 1990 (previously the festival had a local character) at the beginning of August in Michałów near Legnica. – one of the biggest Lemko villages in Poland. The last *Watra*, organized on 7–9 August 2009 attracted about 4000 participants. Around a dozen folk groups which performed during the *Watra* included two Rusyn groups from Slovakia: *Saris* and *Barvinok*. Apart from the best known *Watra* held in Michałów, *Watras* are also organized in late July in Ług near Gorzów Wielkopolski (the 18th edition, held this year, was visited by about 15000 people) and in Żdynia in Lemkovyna. The participants are people of Lemko origin, regardless of their religion, as well as a large group of Lemko culture lovers.

It is not easy to estimate the number of Lemkos living in Poland, because in spite of the political transformation, not all members of this ethnic group declare their national identity openly. This is usually the result of bad experience from the past. According to the national census in 2002 (but there were numerous irregularities during the survey, especially in the range of the nationality), only 5900 people declared Lemko nationality (Misiak 2006), . However, one can presume that the actual number of Lemkos in Poland could be at least several times higher (according to the data from Operation "Vistula", about 30,000–35,000 Lemkos were resettled to the Western Territories then). What is even more difficult to say is how many of them know the Lemko language, and how many speak it on everyday basis (e.g. at home). The Lemko Association promotes the teaching of the language. Most participants of the *Watras* try to speak Lemko, but they are not always fluent.

The law on national and ethnic minorities, passed by the Polish parliament in 2005, granted Lemkos the status of an ethnic minority (the status of a national minority was granted only to members of those nationalities which have their own states). It confirms the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of Lemkos and, what is more, appreciates it. Poland's membership in the European Union obliges our country to enable national and ethnic minorities to freely develop their languages and cultures. Let us hope that the young generation, free of the burden of dramatic events 60 years ago, will make a fruitful use of these possibilities.

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PROBLEMS OF STUDYING CHRISTIAN MINORITIES IN THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST

Artur BOHÁČ

Abstract: *This article is focused on the problems and barriers in studying Middle Eastern Christian minorities especially in social sciences. The article targets Christian minorities living in the Islamic heartland of the Middle East – in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (with slight interferences). The treatment of minority populations is the main reason of the frequent conflicts in the region. Furthermore, the theme of Middle Eastern Christian minorities is highly politicized and controversial, because Middle Eastern states often consider the treatment of minorities their inner question. Studied minorities are not a monolith and their voice is still not unified, although their position in Muslim societies is not generally satisfactory, because they have opposite interests in some affairs and they are also limited by agelong hostility. The main goal of submitted article is to describe the heterogenity of Middle Eastern Christians and to bring several divisions of studied groups based on various factors – religion, language, history, geography, demography, loyalty to the governement etc.*

Key words: *Middle East, Christianity, Islam, minorities, typology*

INTRODUCTION

In spite of wide-spread geographical imaginations of the Middle East as the Arabic and islamic monolith settled by patriotic inhabitants supported by Western mass media and some Middle Eastern states‘ high politicians, strategically important Middle Eastern region is quite heterogeneous land. The Middle Eastern region comprises of relatively numerous ethnic, national, religious, linguistic or peculiar ethno-religious groups. The relation between majority and minorities, especially minority mistreatment, is the major source of various conflicts in the Middle Eastern area. The Middle East and Sub-Saharian Africa, as is known, are the most troubled world macro regions suffering from the wars, criminality, malnutrition etc. Most of recent armed conflicts in the Middle East had roots in unsolved minority problems. Most of post-Ottoman states did not evolve yet a national identity which could encompass their multi-ethnic society. Recently, we were witnesses of intra-state conflicts as Lebanese civil war and chronic Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or international conflicts as the war between Iraq and Iran or Israel and Lebanese Hezballah. These conflicts were narrowly described and analyzed, but there are also many hidden conflicts which are not often promoted in the media.

Anyway, it is not easy to define the Middle East exactly. We know similar cases from Europe ie. difficulties with delimitation of Balkan region or Central European region. There are plenty of opinions and not only geographers fumble with this problem. For example,

Mgr. Artur Boháč
University of Ostrava, Faculty of Science, Department of Human Geography and Regional Development, Kranichova 8, 710 00 Ostrava – Slezská Ostrava, Czech Republic
Tel. +420 732 109 869; e-mail: artur.bohac@osu.cz

the Anglo-American paradigm, concretely *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, consider these countries Middle Eastern: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arabic Emirates and Yemen (Esposito ed. 2003). However, this article targets Christian minorities living in the Arabic Islamic heartland of the Middle East. In reference to my long-term research, this text is centred on Christian minorities in states with consignable Christian presence – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (with slight interferences).

Middle Eastern Christian minorities face many problems nowadays. The biggest problem is pressumably the massive emigration caused by unsatisfactory social status in Middle Eastern countries. Christian minorities are often target of the discrimination or opression. Nevertheless, even Western liberal societies are not immune to xenophobic tendencies against minorities. Especially when a crisis occurs minorities become an immediate target of hatefulness.

The theme of Middle Eastern Christians is highly politicized and controversial, because Middle Eastern states usually consider the treatment of minorities as their inner question, deny any discrimination or even deny the existence of any type of minorities in their lands. Middle Eastern states‘ attitude is understandable, because the question of discriminated minorities is misused as the instrument of foreign policy made by Western powers (Kumaraswamy 2003).

This text is focused on the problems and barriers in studying Middle Eastern Christian minoritites especially in social sciences such as human geography, history, political science, sociology, cultural anthropology etc. This article also attempts to organize obtainable informations and to bring several divisions of heterogenous Middle Eastern Christian minorities.

DEFINING A MINORITY

The term minority, which was abused many times in recent times, is still evolving. The term minority was stabilized as the name for less important social group during the 20th century. Until the 20th century it was used in connection to the distritubution of political power in the legislative organs. Major world religions clasify people into two distinct categories, believers and non-believers. The believer is obviously superior to the non-believer and he has better social status. Islam is no exception to this kind of segregation of people. However, modernization, liberalization, idea of human rights and revolution in communication strongly undermined the religious discrimination in the Western countries. Religious dogmas towards non-believers became problematic. Nevertheless, traditional Islamic world still does not respect and use the term minority and this is probably one of the major reasons of minority mistreatment in most Islamic countries, where minority question is raising despite the stubborn resolve of goverments to remove this issue from public agenda (Kumaraswamy 2007).

A minority is a sociological group which does not constitute a dominant majority of a given society. A minority is not necesarilly a numerical minority, although there are predominantingly described typical numerical minorities in this article. A minority at state level could be simultaneously a majority at regional or local level. The term minority also indicates an qualitative inferiority of given group. In South Africa under the regime of apartheid, white South Africans were according to contemporary perception of the terms

mentioned above a majority, although there were many more black South Africans. We could find a little similar case in the Middle Eastern region in recent history. In Lebanon before reaching Taef agreement, Maronites (Christians) constituted numerical minority, but in fact they were ruling majority and Muslim demographical majority was in subordinated position. That is why nowadays some scholars use alternative terms *subordinate group* and *dominant group*. The term minority group often occurs alongside civil rights, which gained prominence in 20th century. Studying of minority groups includes the research of the whole society which they live within.

The United Nations adopted in 1992 the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. This document extended the Charter of Human Rights from 1948 (Nisan 2002). This amendment, as whole Charter of Human Rights, was not recieved by Islamic countries, which consider these documents unfitting to traditional Islamic values. Islamic countries, members of OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), prefer their own document concerning human rights – The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, which was adopted in 1990 and which contains some contradictory passages.

BASIC FACTS ABOUT MIDDLE EASTERN CHRISTIAN MINORITIES

Studied region is home to numerous groups that are distinct from the majority because of their religion, ethnicity, cultural identity and territorial nationalism. In this article is the main factor which I deal with distinct religion, concretely Christianity. Nevertheless, the religion in the Middle East influences another aspects of social life.

The vast majority of Middle Eastern Christians have deep historical roots in the Middle East and they were majority population in this area fifteen centuries ago, althought they were almost always in subordinated position to Rome, Constantinople, Damascus, Baghdad and Istanbul. Other Christian communities arose later through the migration or religious conversions between various Christian sects. After Arabic and Islamic expansion in the 7th century, the distinct religion became the reason of conflicts with Islamic rulers, although Christians shared the same history and the large part of cultural heritage with Muslims. Islam classifies society into two basic religious entities, Muslims and non-Muslims.

Non-Muslims are divided into non-believers, who should become Muslims or should be slayed, and *al-Kitab*, people who could live within Caliphate if they respect some regulations. Christians and Jews and members of several other monotheist religious sects (the classification as *al-Kitab* was changeable) were called *al-Kitab* (People of the Book). People of the book share many prophets with Islamic religion, which is according to Muslims final message from God. People of the Book were marked also as *dhimmi*, protected people who could live and practise their religion within Islamic state and who had to pay special tax, *jizya*. Islamic tolerance to these people was limited, they cannot organize missionary activities, they were forbidden to have any weapon, to hold political and military power in the state (but especially in Umayyad Caliphate Christians were present in government). Muslim superiority was granted in family matters too, non-Muslim man cannot marry Muslim woman without converting to Islam (Lewis 2000). This system played crucial role in the replacement of Christians with Muslims during a few centuries. Members of Middle Eastern Christian sects survived to these days despite

their chronic vulnerability, but we should realize that the relationships of this minorities to the majority undergone some changes over the generations.

After the turbulent centuries of Crusades and other invasions, when many Middle Eastern Christians were killed, the situation of Christians was improved in Ottoman Empire and the population of Middle Eastern Christians was even increasing. Ottoman Turks were religiously more tolerant than Arabic conquestors and they established the unique system of *millets*, which includes main religious denominations of the whole Empire, Muslim, Jewish, Greek Orthodox and Armenian. Muslim *millet* obviously played a dominant role. The representative authorities of the *millets* were religious leaders. The *millet* system institutionalized legal statuses of Christians in Ottoman Empire and brought the clear identification of the nation with the religion in the Middle East. The number of millets was increasing duting the centuries, especially because of the pressure of European Christian powers during the years of gradual decline of Ottoman Empire. You could see the division of Middle Eastern Christians, which is almost identical to the *millet* system, in the chapter called Religious Division of Middle Eastern Christianity. Another consequence of European dominance was the presence of Roman Catholic or Protestant missionaries in Ottoman Empire. Christian minorities in Ottoman Empire enjoyed the protection of European colonial powers, which led to the equality conceded to non-Muslims which often provoked violent reactions of Muslim majority (Nisan 2002).

There appear revolutionary and nationalist ideas in the Middle East in the 19th century. These ideas imported from Europe were successful firstly among Ottoman Christian minorities. Middle Eastern Christians discovered the Enlightement culture, studied modern European languages and improved their economic status in the empire. Successful Ottoman Christians became active in emancipation efforts. Christian groups which collaborated with the armies of Triple Entente urged for the establishment of their own states in the times of World War I and after it. However, international conferences held in the 20s of the 20th century did not ratify Christians interests. Maronites in fact got the state from European colonial powers, but Assyrian efforts of political emancipation were not fulfilled. Egyptian Copts were loyal to the Egyptian anti-British nationalism.

During European colonial presence Middle Eastern Christians hoped that European powers will grant their autonomy and safety, but after World War II. all European mandates ended and European troops left Middle East and left Middle Eastern Christians to the mercy of their rulers. Then, Middle Eastern Christians were victims of ideologies of nationalism, socialism (however, Christians were active nationalists or socialists) and islamism, which was connected with implementing elements of *sharia* law after the decolonization (Maoz 1999). Second class citizenship for Christians has been renewed in the Middle East, especially in fragmented Iraq and Egypt, where strong Islamic political opposition exists. Generally speaking, autoritharian regimes are more positive for Christians than relatively democratic regimes which could lead to the implementation of political Islam which is the biggest threat for various minorites in Muslim countries.

TYPES OF MIDDLE EASTERN CHRISTIAN MINORITIES

We can observe interesting general rule about the relation between the nation and religion in the Middle Ages in Europe and the Middle East, which strongly influecend current situation. There was national disunity and religious unity (Roman Catholic

Church) in the world of Western Christianity, where the famous principle *"cuius regio, eius religio"* was applied, and national unity (Byzantine Empire, Caliphates) and religious disunity in the world of Eastern Christianity. However, the dominant nation in the Eastern Mediterranean wanted, but could not enforce subordinated groups to leave their ancestral religious sects (Bailey – Bailey 2003). Nevertheless, the ideas of the nationalism and the Enlightment, which came from Europe, also emerged in the Middle East in the 19th century especially among subordinated groups.

The church in the Middle Eastern region is often narrowly conneceted with a nation or ethnic group and the religion is in fact the anchor of their national existence. This principle proved when Middle Eastern nations lost their political power after Byzantine and especially Islamic expansion. The churches, despite of massive Islamization and Arabization, preserved national identity, religion and in some cases mother tongue. This continuing identity show independence of the churches on the state apparatus. These national/religious identities are still preserved even in Western diaspora.

Finally, we can divide Middle Eastern Christian minorities on the base of various factors:

1. According to creating national structures:
   - Religious minorities – created by members of missionary oriented churches, which want to gain believers all around the world uncared for their ethnicity (members of Roman Catholic Church, Greek Orthodox Church, Protestant churches, partly Syriac Orthodox Church and Syriac Catholic Church)
   - Ethno-religious minorities - religious groups narrowly connected with some ethnic structure (it is complicated or impossible to become a member of their churches, if you have different ethnicity), but they usually do not attempt to distinguish lingually from majority (sometimes Copts and Maronites are classified as ethno-religious minority, but typical examples are Druzes or Sikhs)
   - Minority nations – groups which are ethnically, religiously and lingually different from majority (Assyrians, Armenians), their religion is narrowly connected with ethnicity
   - Copts and Maronites – in my opinion specific cases of the nations with diminishing or diminished language, ancient nations religiously and partly ethnically different from their Muslim neighbours
2. According to the origin:
   - Autochtonous minorities (more than 100 years of permanent settlement) – the vast majority of Middle Eastern Christians who live in Middle Eastern region for fifteen centuries
   - Allochtonous minorities – Assyrians and Armenians who came during Ottoman genocide from Anatolia, foreign missioners and workers, refugees (Iraqi Christian runners in Jordan and Syria, Sudanese runners in Egypt)
3. According to the dislocation:
   - Concentrated minorities
   - Dispersed minorities
   - The combination of concentrated and dispersed settlement – Egyptian Christians (concentrated in Upper Egypt around Asyut and in major cities), Iraqi Christians (concentrated in Niniveh Plains on the north and in large cities), Jordanian Chris-

tians (concentrated on the northwest and in large cities), Lebanese Christians (concentrated near Beirut, Byblos), Syrian Christians (concentrated in Al-Jazeera area and in large cities) – Christians could make a majority in some of above mentioned areas and they have Christian quarters in large cities

RELIGIOUS DIVISION OF MIDDLE EASTERN CHRISTIANITY

The religious history of Middle Eastern Christianity is very complicated, but I try to outline the facts important for the better understanding of this article.

The united Christian Church was markedly affected by the disconnection of Nestorians and Monophysites in the 5th century. Heretical doctrine of Nestorianism was succesful especially among Assyrian nation (Assyrian Church of the East, Nestorians), Monophysitism took roots among Copts (Coptic Orthodox Church), Armenians (Armenian Apostolic Church) and Western Assyrians (Syriac Orthodox Church, Jacobites). Another religious sect set in the 7th century was monotheletism which found its followers among Maronites (Maronite Church), people settled in Lebanese mountains. Melkites (Melkite Church) were the Jacobites who convert to the Greek Orthodoxy. All these churches were rivals and dogmatic clashes often led into bloody incidents.

Following changes of Middle Eastern Christianity were connected with the proselytistic activities of Roman Catholic missioners who were more succesful than their Protestant colleagues. Maronite Church and Melkite Church signed union with Rome and became completely Catholic. Other Oriental churches also were not immune to Roman Catholic doctrine and they were divided into old Oriental Orthodox churches and new Oriental Catholic Churches (Armenian Catholic Church, Coptic Catholic Church, Chaldean Catholic Church, Syriac Catholic Church). Orthodox believers hated Catholic deseters, but nowadays the relations between these groups are improving (Filipi 1998).

After more than fifteen centuries of the diversification, we can distinguish four Church families. This typology is identical to the structure of MECC (Middle East Council of Churches) which is based on Ottoman *millet* system:

The Oriental Orthodox family
- Coptic Orthodox Church
- Assyrian Church of the East
- Syriac Orthodox Church
- Armenian Apostolic Church

The Orthodox family
- Greek Orthodox Church

The Catholic family
- Roman Catholic Church
- Coptic Catholic Church
- Chaldean Catholic Church
- Syriac Catholic Church
- Armenian Catholic Church
- Melkite Church
- Maronite Church

The Reformed family
- Evangelical Episcopal churches

- Lutheran churches
- Evangelical churches etc.

BASIC CHURCH ADMINISTRATION

The Middle Eastern church administration is based especially on the existence of ancient patriarchates. The patriarchates of Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Constantinople and Rome constituted so called Church pentarchy. However, some churches which splited from the orthodoxy founded another patriarchates (Filipi 1998). Nowadays, many patriarchal sees are not located in the traditional places because of various reasons. You can see the current location of the patriarchates in parentheses behind the official name of the church.

The ancient Eastern Patriarchates in the pattern of their multiple correspondencies to the different churches of today:

Patriarchate of Antioch
- Greek Orthodox Church (Damascus)
- Syriac Orthodox Church (Damascus)
- Syriac Catholic Church (Beirut)
- Melkite Church (Damascus)
- Maronite Church (Bkerke – Lebanon)

Patriarchate of Alexandria
- Greek Orthodox Church (Alexandria)
- Coptic Orthodox Church (Cairo)
- Coptic Catholic Church (Cairo)

Patriarchate of Jerusalem
- Greek Orthodox Church (Jerusalem)
- Roman Catholic Church (Jerusalem)
- Armenian Apostolic Church (Jerusalem)

Patriarchate of Constantinople
- Greek Orthodox Church (Istanbul)
- Armenian Apostolic Church (Istanbul)

Patriarchate of the Ancient Church of the East
- Assyrian Church of the East (Chicago and Baghdad)
- Chaldean Catholic Church (Baghdad)

Armenian Apostolic Church recognizes also specific patriarchates, Catholicosate of Echmiadzin in Armenia and Catholicosate of Cilicia based in Antellias in Lebanon. Armenian Catholic Church has its patriarchate in Beirut and it is named Patriarchate of Cilicia of the Armenians.

The Middle Eastern patriarchates have two types of jurisdiction:
- Regional jurisdiction (the churches which have more than one patriarchate) – Greek Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Armenian Apostolic Church
- World jurisdiction (one patriarchate for one church) – Assyrian Church of the East, Syriac Orthodox Church, Coptic Orthodox Church, Armenian Catholic Church, Coptic Catholic Church, Chaldean Catholic Church, Maronite Church, Melkite Church, Syriac Catholic Church

The churches maintain the system of geographical parishes organized into dioceses and archidioceses.

IDENTITY PROBLEMS

Long-term Islamization, Arabization and inter-Christian quarrels strongly influenced the identity of Middle Eastern Christian groups. The identity is very important instrument to the differentation from majority populations. Middle Eastern Christians are often wrongly marked as Arab Christians, although only few percents of Middle Eastern Christians (especially from Jordan and Syria) are people of Arab origin. Middle Eastern Christian majority has pre-Arab origin. National myths filled by legends about cruel fate are extremly popular among Middle Eastern Christians and have some real base (Fargues 1997). Maronites steadily consider themselves as descendants of Phoenicians and Copts declare pharaonic heritage of their nation. Assyrians have not unified identity because of their religious fragmentation. Nestorian Assyrians consider themselves as descendants of ancient Assyrians and include non-Nestorian groups under Assyrian ethnicity. Assyrian sub-group Chaldeans oppose Nestorian Assyrian nationalism and declare Chaldean heritage or Chaldeans describe themselves as Arab Christians. Third Assyrian sub-group Syriacs (Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Catholics) is partly loyal to Assyrian nationalism, but there are some supporters of Arab nationalism or even Aramean nationalism. There are many tempestuous academic debates and doubts about the identity of Assyrian people. The majority of Syrian and Jordanian Christians consider themselves to be Arab Christians.

PROBLEMS IN DEMOGRAPHY

Christians in the Middle East number between ten and thirteen million (see tab. 1) compared to 150 mil. Muslims. These numbers are changeable, because Christians are leaving their homelands or in less cases they are coming back. Generally, the number of Christians living in Middle Eastern states is undoubtedly declining, although we usually do not have accurate and fully reliable data. Christian families are usually smaller than Muslim families, there are some mixed marriages and convertions to Islam, but the most obvious reason for the decline of Middle Eastern Christian is massive emigration to non-Arab states. The emigration is the biggest problem of Christian communities not only because of decreasing size of the communities, but because of diminishing quality of them. For once community falls below a certain size, it loses its cultural and social importance.

The Middle Eastern states often pretend to be religiously and ethnically homogenous and sometimes, as I mentioned, deny the existence of minorities, which are considered as potential enemies linked to foreign powers. Denying of the existence or the importance of Middle Eastern minorities is connected with falsifying history and the negation of regional multiethnic mosaic. However, non-Muslims and non-Arabs played quite important role in the development of Islamic/Arabic states in last two centuries. For example, Michel Aflaq, Greek Orthodox Christian from Damascus was the main founder and thinker of pan Arab nationalist party Baath. Makram Ebeid, Coptic Orthodox Christian from Egypt, was the leader of Egyptian nationalist party al-Wafd (Nisan 2002).

There were organized censuses considering the religious affilation in the Ottoman era. Nowadays, none of studied states provides actual statistics on the religion (in recent history, all Middle Eastern states provided these statistics). However, in Jordan and Egypt every

citizen should choose one belief from religions recognized by the state and his religion is written down in his ID card. The record of religious affilation in ID card could ease a discrimination ie. identifying the foes during the civil war in Lebanon. In Egypt there are another sources for informations about number of believers provide the registration of births, marriages and deaths. These informations could be more accurate than numbers from censuses, because non-Muslim people could hide their religion in censuses, but births or deaths are very important rites (Fargues 1997). There is one general rule that churches usually exaggerate numbers of believers and the governments do the opposite. There are informations about governmental manipulations or about Christians who declared themselves as Muslims due to the pressure of their environment. For some scholars is typical untrue premise, that whole Middle Eastern population belongs to some religion. There are atheist and agnostic persons in the Middle East, but they do not officially declare their non-belief, especially if they are from Muslim community. There is another problem with the classification of ethno-religious or national minorities as entirely religious groups (for example Copts in Egypt or Assyrians in Iraq) in censuses.

Tab. 1: Estimated number of Christians in observed countries

Country	**Absolute number of Christians**	**Relative number of Christians** (%)	**Confessional affilation** (the most popular churches - descending in accordance to the number of believers)
Egypt	8 000 000	10	Coptic Orthodox Church, Coptic Catholic Church, Protestant churches, Armenian Apostolic Church, Greek Orthodox Church, Melkite Church
Iraq	800 000	3	Chaldean Catholic Church, Assyrian Church of the East, Syriac Catholic Church, Syriac Orthodox Church, Armenian Apostolic Church, Armenian Orthodox Church
Jordan	300 000	5	Greek Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Melkite Church, Protestant churches, Amenian Apostolic Church, Syriac Orthodox Church
Lebanon	1 500 000	40	Maronite Church, Greek Orthodox Church, Armenian Apostolic Church, Melkite Church, Syriac Catholic Church, Syriac Orthodox Church
Syria	1 700 000	9	Greek Orthodox Church, Armenian Apostolic Church, Syriac Orthodox Church, Maronite Church, Syriac Catholic Church, Armenian Catholic Church
Total	**12 300 000**	**9**	

Source: Own analysis made in 2008

STAGE OF ARABIZATION

Most of existing Christian groups resisted Islamization, but they cannot resist Arabization and their ancestral languages vanished or they are present only in liturgy, where Arabic also expanded. Only Armenians and Assyrians kept their authentic languages alive. Assyrian Nestorians use *sureth* language (Assyrian or neo-Aramean), Syriacs use *turoyo* language (Syriac) and Chaldeans use Chaldean language (Chaldean neo-Aramean). Armenians and Assyrians usually speak Arabic or Kurdish as a second language. You could still hear old Aramaic in Syriac Ortodox Christian village Maloula in Southeastern Syria. Maronites speak often French instead of Arabic because of their historical ties with France. Maronites‘ French speaking is also the emphasization of their non-Arabic identity. The Coptic language is used in daily communication by a few enthusiasts. There exists a religious educational system in the Middle East. In Assyrian and Armenian Christian schools pupils are taught Assyrian languages or Armenian language (Nisan 2002).

LOYALTY TO THE GOVERNMENT

Generally, we can find people loyal and disloyal to their governements in every Middle Eastern Christian group. On the one hand there are Christians satisfied with relatively safe living in authoritarian states, which protect them partly from the Islamists, on the other hand there are relative liberal Christians calling for democratic changes, but these changes could strenghten islamists whose popularity among Muslim people is rising. Christian diaspora living in Western states systematically criticise central governments. Nevertheless, majority of Middle Eastern Christians is mostly loyal to the governments which attempt to prevent islamic radicalism (Egypt – Hosni Mubarak, Iraq – Jalal Talabani, Jordan – Abdullah II., Syria – Bashar Assad) and to governments with Christian perceptible presence (Lebanon – Michel Suleiman). The governement usually fiscally support loyal Christian clergy. When you travel around the Middle Eastern countries, you could meet extremly loyal Christians that praise a central government overmuch. Probably, they are afraid of secret services, especially in Syria or Egypt.

AUTONOMOUS TENDENCIES

The emergence of the modern Middle East indeed worked against the minorities. Different ethnic groups were put together and homogenous ethnic groups were divided by the territorial boundaries. These changes were the cause of massive emigration of afflicted groups. Nevertheless, these emigrants were the biggest supporters of demands for minorities‘ special protection, which outgrew into autonomous tendencies (Phares 2001).

Nowadays, we can find autonomous tendencies especially among Iraqi Assyrians – they attempt to establish Assyrian region in northern Iraq due to Article 125 of Iraqi Constitution and some viable proposal exist. Another Christian groups who dealed with autonomous tendencies in recent times were Maronites (during Lebanese civil war – so-called Republic of Jouniya), Copts (intended autonomous region in Upper Egypt), but these wishes were not fulfilled (Nisan 2002). Autonomous tendencies are usually supported by the diaspora organizations (Middle Eastern Christian diaspora is really numerous worldwide), but they have not strong external patronage of the states. Sometimes, political activities of diasporic organizations, which highlight the plight of Middle Eastern Christians, complicate the position of Christians living in Muslim lands. Another problem of achieving autonomy is the lack of power of mostly dispersed Christians in the Middle Eastern region.

CONCLUSIONS

None of Middle Eastern state is ethnically or religiously homogenous, although central governments tend to ignore various minorities. Most of these minorities pre-date the state formation in the Middle East. Middle Eastern Christian minorities are quite heterogenous social groups endangered not only by their Muslim rulers and growing Muslim population, but by their disunity too. They have too often opposite interests in specific affairs and they are limited by agelong hostility too. The immigration of Christians is another serious problem.

In many cases Christians are the only non-Muslim autochtonous population which represents valuable force for the pluralism within Arab societies. If they were able to play signifcant role in cultural and political life, they could support the development of predominantly Muslim societies, as they did in Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. The future of Christian minorities is narrowly connected not only with the solution of political issues, such as Iraqi and Lebanese questions and next, but with the modernization of Arab societies too. Middle Eastern politicians should not perceive Christian minorities as the potential traitors, but as the natural part of Middle Eastern society. They should try to evolve a national identity that would incorporate various minorities. This article proved that there are many barriers in studying present-day Middle Eastern Christians and there is a need for connection various social sciences findings about them.

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PROBLEMS OF STUDYING CHRISTIAN MINORITIES IN THE ISLAMIC MIDDLE EAST

Summary

This article shows that none of Middle Eastern state is ethnically or religiously homogenous, although central governments tend to pretend a homogenity and ignore various minorities. Most of these minorities pre-date the modern state formation in the Middle East and many of them pre-date Arab/Islamic conquests. Middle Eastern Christian minorities are quite heterogenous social groups endangered not only by their Muslim rulers and growing Muslim population, but by their disunity too. They have too often opposite interests in specific affairs and they are limited by agelong hostility too. The immigration of Christians is another serious problem. The future of Middle Eastern Christian is uncertain.

In many cases Christians are the only non-Muslim autochtonous population which represents valuable force for the pluralism within Arab societies. If they were able to play signifcant role in cultural and political life, they could support the development of predominantly Muslim societies, as they did in Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. The future of Christian minorities is narrowly connected not only with the solution of political issues, such as Iraqi and Lebanese questions and next, but with the modernization of Arab societies too. Middle Eastern politicians should not perceive Christian minorities as the potential traitors, but as the natural part of Middle Eastern society. They should try to evolve a national identity that would incorporate various minorities. This article proved that there are many barriers in studying present-day Middle Eastern Christians and there is a need for connection various social sciences findings about them.

SPATIAL DIFFERENTIATION OF NECROGEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS IN CZECHIA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND FEATURES IN THE LANDSCAPE

Martina HUPKOVÁ

Abstact: *The interdisciplinary article analyzes the spatial differentiation in the manner, in which Czech society has dealt with death, as well as its causes, consequences and features in the landscape. The subject of death has become taboo in Czech society, and yet, especially, the manner of caring for deceased people is a sign of a society's culture. Necrogeographical aspects – the manner, in which people deal with death and forms of cemeteries – reflect culture at different levels: state, region and local. Spatial differentiation of necrogeographical aspects within Czechia is analyzed via field surveys of model regions. Points of interaction between religion and method of burial are searched for in the article, because of the presumed influence of religion on the manner, in which people deal with death. The article focuses on an analysis of regional differences in Czechia, in terms of the manner, in which people treat the deceased (the phenomenon of cremation) and cemeteries. Cemeteries form a part of the landscape and are places of great significance, reflecting the culture of citizens living in a specific time and place (regional culture).*
Key words*: necrogeography, religion, differentiation, regional culture, Czechia*

1. INTRODUCTION

Death is inseparably connected to life and yet this topic continues to be suppressed by society (tabooism of death). As late as halfway through the 20th century, there were practically no scientific studies concerning death. By the end of the 20th century, scientific circles and even the general population began again to discuss death. In Czechia, however, tabooism of death, due to the suppression of spirituality as part of Marxist ideology, is for the most part still practised today (Nešporová 2004). The perception of death, manner of burial and the form of cemetery are all manifestations that differ in space and time and which reflect the culture of a population, practising a certain "method of dealing with death". The topic of death and burial rituals, as a subject of scientific research, is primarily studied in sociology and anthropology (Dethlefsen, Deetz 1966, Gorman, DiBlasi 1981, Kroeber 1927), but also in archaeology, scientific studies of religion and other disciplines. World geography studies this topic to a lesser degree as part of so-called necrogeography (Francaviglia 1971, Hartig, Dunn 1998, Christopher 1995, Kniffen 1967), while Czech geography, for the most part, ignores it (Chromý, Kuldová 2006). Geography's contribution should focus on searching for spatial relationships, in analysing regional differentiation

Mgr. Martina Hupková
Charles University Prague, Department of Social Geography and Regional Development, Albertov 6, CZ-12843 Prague, Czechia
tel.: 00420 721 859 242, 00420 722 680 333, e-mail: martina.hupkova@seznam.cz

and in applying the concepts of the so-called new cultural geography, which emphasises research on identity, sense of place and heritage. Cemeteries as well as manner of burial have a significant sacred (spiritual) side (Nešporová 2004, Heller, Mrázek 2004), which means that concepts from geography of religion should also be considered in studying cemeteries.

Necrogeography, therefore, is a discipline of human geography, which explores the spatial differentiation (and reasons for spatial differentiation) of manifestations relating with death and how these necrogeographical aspects (manner of dealing with death and cemeteries) and their expressions in the landscape (cemeteries, crematoria, columbaria, etc.) reflect human culture. Necrogeography draws significantly on cultural geography and geography of religion and can be considered to be their sub-discipline. It also draws on the ideas of historical geography and other geographical (settlement geography, planning, regional development) as well as non-geographical (scientific and applied) disciplines. Necrogeography is characterised by interdisciplinary research (Hupková 2008).

The objective of this article is to analyse the basic differentiation of necrogeographical aspects in Czechia, on the basis of comparisons concerning three model territories. This analysis contributes both to the description of regional culture and to the description of the general geographical organization of Czech society. Clarifying the reasons behind the assumption of a high level of differentiation in necrogeographical aspects also forms a significant part of the article. In light of the significant influence of religion on burial practices, contact fields between religion and burial, which indicate the connections between the two manifestations, are described. The most significant factor, which influences burial practices at the national level, is religion. Does the factor of religion also express itself at lower scale levels: regional, micro-regional or local? Do other significant factors exist at these lower levels, which influence the observed phenomenon? What characteristics do the necrogeographical aspects have in the various model territories and what fundamental differences can be found among the territories and within them? And how do these differences reflect the culture of the respective local populations?

2. ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF DIFFERENCES – CONTACT FIELDS BETWEEN RELIGION AND BURIAL PRACTICES

The assumption that differences exist within Czechia in terms of the characteristics of burial practices is based upon knowledge of the connectivity between religion and burial practices. These contact fields between religion and burial practices, which have served as the foundation for necrogeographical analysis at a micro-regional level, are described in the following paragraphs.

2.1 High cremation rate in Czechia

Czechia stands out as being home to an unusually high cremation rate. As portrayed in fig. 1, Czechia, with a cremation rate of 79 %, ranks among the highest countries, such as Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore, in a hypothetical cremation ranking; while the cremation rate in Slovakia, Czechia's closest neighbour, reaches a mere 17 %. Czechia's

position at the top of this ranking[1] is significant, primarily due to the fact that it ranks among Asian countries, for which cremation has been typical (or commonplace) throughout their historical development. Beginning in the 9th century, in-ground burial, connected with the burial of Jesus Christ, was typical in Czechia and throughout Europe. Inhumation corresponded with religion – with Christianity. Czechia is one of the most secularized countries[2] in the world. At present, 32.1 % of Czechia's residents claim membership in a religious denomination (Havlíček 2005). During the 20th century, the level of religiosity in the country decreased by more than 65 %. In its European context, the remarkably significant position of both of these phenomena (cremation and secularization) in Czechia provides a basis for assumptions concerning the conditions of both manifestations as well as their mutual connectedness.



Fig. 1: Cremation rate in selected countries world in 2004
Source: author's creation, source of data concerning the cremation rate: Davies & Mates 2005

Czechia is the most secularized country in Europe, according to nearly all indicators of religiosity – portion of believers, orthodoxy rate and attendance at worship services (Lužný, Navrátilová 2001). According to Lužný and Navrátilová, three primary factors contributed to secularization trends in Czech society. These are:

1) The anti-Catholic attitude of Czechia's general public (from Hussitism to national revival and resistance to the Hapsburg empire to Communist atheism)

1 These are countries, for which the Cremation Society of Great Britain (CSGB) keeps records.

2 Park (1994) conceives secularization primarily in three ways: a) the elimination of religious faith (increasing separation of church and state), b) the unimportance or rejection of religious ideas (a decline in interest in religious traditions as well as in the familiarity with and respect for church representatives) and c) the process of thoughts and actions becoming more worldly, leading to the ultimate end of interest in religious ideas.

2) Secularization tendencies prescribed by the structural differentiation of modern society
3) Atheist propaganda from the communist regime

Throughout its history, Czechia has been influenced by many religious directions – as early as the 9th century, Czechia could be considered a Catholic land. During the 15th century, the protestant movement began to develop in the region and by the 16th century Protestantism dominated. The Czech lands were subject to re-Catholicization, beginning halfway through the 17th century. The era of communist dictatorship as well as the expulsion of German, and primarily Catholic, residents from Czechia's border regions also played significant roles (Havlíček 2006).

At the beginning of a new millennium, the Czech religious scene is characterized by secularization and a large degree of religious heterogeneity. While the numbers adherents to large churches are decreasing, the number of members of small religious groups and churches are growing. With large churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church, Protestant churches and the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, a decrease of ¼ up to ½ of adherents in Czechia can be observed between 1991 and 2001. Progressively developing churches include smaller Christian societies (Brethren Assemblies, Moravian Church, Baptists), Jehovah's Witnesses, the Orthodox Church (due to the immigration of Russians and Ukrainians) and others. Although Czech society is home to a high degree of secularization, increasing interest in occultism and other alternative forms of spirituality are evident (Hamplová 2000). The Czech religious scene is becoming continuously more diversified (Havlíček, Hupková 2008).

It can be supposed that previous historical developments, in much the same manner in which they proved fundamental to the development secularization in Czechia, also created conditions that promoted Czechia's high cremation rate.

Figure 2 depicts the development of the cremation rate in Czechia along with developments in the level of religiosity, as a means of showing how these two manifestations interact with one another. Unfortunately, data on the level of religiosity are only available for six years – 1910, 1921, 1931, 1950, 1991 and 2001 (Population and housing census – ČSÚ 2007). It is evident from the graph that with a decreasing level of religiosity (increasing secularization), the cremation rate increases. The shapes of both variable relationships make it clear that the development of both manifestations is analogous in opposite directions. The data are slightly skewed by the existence of a joint, Czech-Slovak state.

It is clear that growth in the cremation rate began with the legalization of cremation (1918) and the completion of the first crematorium (1917). Prior to the beginning of World War I, the cremation rate grew slowly but consistently (on average, 0.3 % per year). During World War II, a distinct increase in the cremation rate occurred that was evidently connected with burning the bodies of dead soldiers and Jews. Cremations during World War II, however, were not accurately recorded and, as result, it is necessary to use the associated

quantitative data only for rough estimates. After the end of World War II, the cremation rate increased at a quicker tempo, than previous to the war (on average, 1.5 % annually). This development can be explained by the increased availability of cremation (by the end of World War II, there were 13 crematoria in the country) and by the establishment of new societal-political conditions in Czechoslovakia. The new political climate supported cremation and, at the same time, took a negative stance towards religion. In 1948, the ratio of believers in the population fell significantly, with the beginning of persecution of believers (Daněk, Štěpánek 1992).



Fig. 2: Developments in the cremation rate and the level of religiosity in Czechia, 1910 – 2006
Source: author's creation, source of data concerning the cremation rate: Davies & Mates 2005, source of data on the level of religiosity: ČSÚ 2007
Missing data: cremation rate for 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1989 – these data were calculated as the linear average of previous and subsequent values

2.2 Burial as an indication of religion

Cemeteries, as the object of study for necrogeography, certainly have a spiritual side. To a certain degree, religion itself even influences the manner, in which people deal with death. The practices of burial rites are derived from notions about existence after death, wherein such notions arise from a person's faith (Nešporová 2004). According to Malinowsky (1948 in Nešporová 2004), death is the most important source of religion.

While Czechia clearly is exceptional with its low level of religiosity, it is important to distinguish between traditional religiosity, small and dynamically expanding churches and the development of alternative spirituality. According to Hamplová, alternative spirituality (occultism) is not a trivial thing; in other words, its influence on the manner, in which people deal with death, should also not be considered negligible. Hamplová also points out that the "*level of religiosity*" indicator is not appropriate for expressing the religious faith of Czechia's inhabitants, because some believers claim membership in a religion as a

historical or cultural tradition and by no means due to the fact that they uphold or adhere to its religious dogma. Nešpor has also weighed in concerning the distinction between the terms "*believer*" and "*atheist*". He claims that some people refer to themselves as being "*without religion*", when in reality they are merely trying to emphasize that they do not belong to any particular church (Nešpor 2004). While I am aware of the problems associated with strictly defining the terms "*believer*" and "*atheist*" in various censuses, due to the absence of other data sources, information regarding level of religiosity shall be utilized in this study as it can be gleaned from statistical surveys.

In certain religions, such as, for instance, Buddhism, Sikhism and Hinduism[3], cremation has been established as the primary (sole) manner of carrying out funeral rites (Davies, Mates 2005). In Indo-European nations, burning was considered the primary manner of parting with the deceased. Burning was seen as the most effective method for "cleansing" the dead body and preventing the dead from returning. This practice was at variance with Christianity, which gave preference to burial in the ground. In-ground burial, as a customary practice, expanded into Czechia, to replace burning, at approximately the same time as Christianity (Unger 2002). Christianity and Islam prefer burial in the ground (Heller, Mrázek 2004), while other religions do not specify a method for burial. The method of burial is not important at all in certain religions, such as, for instance, the Hare Krishna Movement, in which dying itself (as a process) is much more important than the method of burial. The body is only a container of sorts and the soul lives on after death (Nešporová 2004).

Religious faith does not merely predetermine the manner of burial, the manner for dealing with death in general (the significance of burial, mourning, cemeteries) also arises out of religious beliefs. As Nešporová indicates in her master's thesis, differences exist even within Christianity – Catholics view a funeral as a way of bidding farewell to a deceased person, while for Protestants a funeral is important in helping the survivors to cope with death (Nešporová 2004). The portion of burials held without a funeral ceremony and the portion of unclaimed urns (urns not claimed and left in a crematorium, after cremation) is very high in Czechia. The portion of burials without a funeral ceremony is estimated at 1/3. In neighbouring Germany, this portion has been estimated to be 5%. However, according to psychologists, the funeral plays an important role in helping people cope with death. Several reasons to explain the high number of burials without a funeral ceremony can be found in the literature. According to psychologist Klimeš, the funeral as a dignified farewell is disappearing due to the fact that death is a relegated phenomenon, which people would rather not think about (Cihelka 2007). In addition, we can attribute this manifestation either to the economic advantages of burial without a funeral ceremony or to its greater intimacy. Another reason could even be a negative reaction to the ostentatious funerals of the communist era (Malinová 2002).

3 Hindus practice cremation, followed by throwing the deceased's ashes into the sacred Ganges River. Adherents to Hinduism, who live outside India, hope that their ashes will be transported to the Ganges and thrown in (Nešporová 2004) or they have their ashes thrown into another river, near their place of residence (Davies & Mates 2005).

2.3 Dependence of the cremation rate on socio-economic characteristics of the world's countries

Religion is a fundamental differentiating factor in terms of necrogeographical aspects at the global level. In a statistical analysis of 35 world countries, a significant relationship was confirmed to exist between the manner of burial and the level and type of religiosity.

Factors, which impact the manner of burial were discovered through a statistical analysis of the cremation rate's dependence on socio-economic characteristics and data concerning religion for various countries throughout the world (the number of countries, for which the analysis was carried out = 35). The analysis confirmed the existence of a relationship, in which the cremation rate was dependant on the following characteristics: a) socio-economic data: area, population, population density, GDP (per capita, PPP in USD), the HDI index, life expectancy, level of urbanization, portion of the population older than 65 years of age, illiteracy rate; and b) data concerning religion – portion of the population which were adherents to: no denomination, any church, Christianity, Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, indigenous religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinese religions, Shintoism, Bahai, other. For each of these data, its correlation with the cremation rate was calculated using Pearson's correlation coefficient.

Analysis confirmed that the cremation rate is dependent on religious faith. This dependent relationship exists not only for the level of religiosity, but also for the type of religiosity. The type of religion that is practiced in a country, along with its views on death and burial, is of primary importance. Fig. 3 displays the results of the analysis, and schematically lists the dependence of the cremation rate on various religions. The table also includes specific notes concerning funeral practices of the religions. It is evident from fig. 3 that, in general, the cremation rate exhibits a negative correlation with western religions (Christianity and Judaism) and a positive correlation with eastern religions. Protestantism, which views, and has viewed, cremation as a customary method for human burial, forms an exception to this claim.

Believers in Czechia are characterized by a high degree of spatial differentiation. In fig. 4 (below), the portion of believers in the total population is shown at the municipality level in Czechia, wherein a clear gradient of increasing religiosity can be seen to follow a northeast to southwest direction. In terms of religiosity, Czechia can be roughly divided into an atheist north and a religious south, while it is also possible to observe increasing levels of religiosity from west to east. The impact of the former Czech-German language border can also be discerned, wherein the Sudetenland is more secularized. The size of a municipality also plays a role. Larger cities exhibit a lower level of religiosity than do smaller municipalities and villages. In light of these significant differences in religiosity in Czechia, I also expect significant differences to exist in funeral/burial practices.

Fig. 3: Dependence of the cremation rate on religion

	Religion type	Dependence of cremation rate	Specific notes concerning funeral practices
1	**Christianity**	—*	Support for inhumation, like Jesus, resurrection of the body
2	*Catholic*	—	Support for inhumation, like Jesus, resurrection of the body
3	*Protestant*	+	It is not important, burial is a less-important ordinance, in practice: support for cremation
4	*Orthodox*	—	Support for inhumation, like Jesus, resurrection of the body
5	**Islam**	o	Support for inhumation, placing the body, in a shroud, into the ground
6	**Judaism**	—	Support for inhumation, emphasis on the observance of all rituals (a dead body is considered to be contaminating)
7	**Indigenous religions**	+	Depends on the exact type of religion
8	**Hinduism**	+	Support for cremation, then throwing the ashes into a sacred river = connected with a "saint", resurrection of the soul, which is considered an independent entity
9	**Buddhism**	+**	Support for cremation, like Buddha
10	**Chinese religion**	+	Depends on the exact type of religion, emphasis on the observance of rituals – belief in the immortality of the soul necessitates exact manners for dealing with the body
11	**Shintoism**	+***	Support for cremation, burial according to Buddhist tradition

Source: author's calculations, N = 35
*Note: dependence of the cremation rate on religion is: + positive, - negative, o neutral; the existence of significant correlations: *with a value of -0.555 at the 0.01 level; ** with a value of 0.429 at the 0.05 level; *** with a value of 0.376 at the 0.05 level.*



Fig. 4: Level of religiosity in Czechia's municipalities highlighting the model territories
Zdroj: Havlíček, Hupková 2008

3. DIFFERENTIATION OF NECROGEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS IN MODEL REGIONS

3.1 Methods

The differentiation of necrogeographical aspects in Czechia is studied through the comparison of findings from model areas (micro-regions) as well as from comparisons of the findings within each model area (seeking differences at the local level).

Field research was conducted in July 2008 and consisted of a number of segments. The research included a comprehensive survey of each area and of sacral objects in the area, along with interviews with residents. Its objective was to discover as much as possible about the role of religion in each area. In addition, cemeteries were visited and photo-documented to enable comparisons to be made between them. The definitive portion of this field research proved to be directed interviews with persons, who are somehow involved in funeral and burial services. These key persons include Adámek (owner of a funeral service company in Sušice), Charvát (owner of a funeral service company in Klobouky u Brna) and, for Strání microregion, Martinka (Priest of the Roman Catholic parish in Nivnice) and Blaha (deputy mayor of Korytná Municipality). The purpose of visits to funeral service providers was not merely to conduct an interview, but also to visit the funeral institute.

The model territories were selected in such a way as to ensure that they were completely different, in terms of religiosity, from one another. This was done so that the influence of

religion on the manner, in which people deal with the deceased, could be explored. Sušice microregion (NUTS III Plzeň, NUTS IV Klatovy) is the first model territory; Klobouky microregion (NUTS III Southern Moravia, NUTS IV Břeclav) is the second and the third is Strání microregion (NUTS III Zlín, NUTS IV Uherské Hradiště) – fig. 4. All three model territories are rural in nature.

Sušice microregion is an area that lies along the former Czech-German language border. As such, it can be expected to be subject to the impacts of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, which include a weaker relationship to the area and to its cemeteries. The level of religiosity is low in this area – approximately 35 %. Klobouky microregion is a traditionally religious region, its level of religiosity reaches 55 %. Strání microregion represents the Moravian-Slovak border, where levels of religiosity are highest for all of Czechia. The level of religiosity in Strání microregion is a very high 85 %. I expect that in areas with the highest levels of religiosity, religion will have a greater impact on the manner, in which people deal with death.

3.2 Evaluation of necrogeographical aspects in the model territories

In terms of the manner of burial, the model territories are quite different and these differences proportionately correspond with the level of religiosity. In Sušice microregion the cremation rate is roughly 65 % (Blatná Crematorium), in Klobouky microregion it is only 25 % (Hustopeče Crematorium) and in Strání microregion the number of cremations drop to 0 % (during the past five years, there are only 3 cremations on record). In each of the model territories, inhumations consist primarily of church funerals while cremations account for the majority of secular funerals. According to the individuals surveyed, no significant changes concerning the manner of burial have occurred, over the past ten years; rates for cremation and inhumation have remained stable.

Differences can be found even within the various micro-regions. These are primarily differences between cities and village municipalities. Cremation is more common in cities, while inhumation is more common in villages, which corresponds with the level of religiosity of municipalities. In the largest cities, such as Prague, Brno and Plzeň, the cremation rate can reach values of up to 90 %. High percentages of burials without a funeral ceremony are also found in the largest cities. This particular manifestation (the portion of burials without a funeral ceremony) also exhibits an east-west gradient; however, Prague is home to the highest percent of burials without a funeral ceremony. In Plzeň the portion of burials without a funeral ceremony is 80 % (Adámek 2008), while in Brno it is only 50 % (Charvát 2008). Burials without funeral ceremonies are a specialty of large cities, due to higher levels of anonymity in large cities. In rural areas it is common for the entire village (a representative from each family) to take part in a funeral; whereas, in cities, neighbours often do not know one another. Haškovcová points out that people prefer burials without a funeral ceremony due to economic reasons (Haškovcová 2007). At present, the portion of burials without a funeral ceremony is increasing even in smaller cities, such as Sušice (12 000 inhabitants) for instance. Along with the increasing portion of burials without a funeral ceremony, the number of unclaimed urns is also rising.

According to both of the interviewed owners of funeral service companies, financial burden does not impact the selection of a manner of burial. Prices of cremation and inhumation in Sušice fluctuate at similar levels. Cremation costs 2 800 CZK, while inhumation costs 3 000 CZK. In Klobouky microregion, the price for cremation is actually higher than the price for inhumation. This is due to the distance of the crematorium as well as the price of cremation in the nearest crematorium in Hustopeče. Because the cremation rate is lower in Moravia than in Bohemia, the price of cremation in Moravian crematoria is higher to ensure that crematoria remain profitable.

As of yet, cancellation of the funeral benefit (5 000 CZK), with the introduction of Act No. 261/2007 Coll. (effective 1. 1. 2008), has not had any impact on burial practices in the model territories. Neither the number of burials without a funeral ceremony nor the number of cremations has increased. According to Adámek (Adámek 2008), anyone who desires to have a burial with a funeral ceremony acts in accordance with their wishes, with or without help from a government benefit. It becomes evident, therefore, from the field research that financial matters do not play a significant role in burial practices. Differences in the manner of burial in the model territories are caused by non-economic factors, of which religion is the primary factor.

As stated previously, significant differences also exist, within the model territories themselves, in terms of the ways people deal with death. In Sušice microregion, the primary differentiating factor is a municipality's size. Rural municipalities are traditionally home to a higher level of religiosity and, correspondingly, such municipalities also exhibit a higher inhumation rate than cities. It is also customary in small municipalities for many people from the village to participate in a funeral (it is a social event). For this reason larger funerals are held, often with a church ceremony. Strání microregion is quite homogenous in this regard, because cremation is practically nonexistent. Nearly all burials are church burials and traditions, connected with death, are observed and maintained in the region. According to the deputy mayor of Korytná Municipality (Blaha 2008), a large revival of religious traditions – coming after twenty or thirty years of decline – occurred in this area, about five years ago. It is tradition for the entire municipality to gather on the evening before a burial to pray together for the deceased. A procession from the church to the cemetery follows. Another custom from the past, in which the family keeps the body of the deceased in their home, where they pray for him/her, until the funeral, is also, remarkably, still practiced here. According to Martinka (Martinka 2008), however, the question remains as to whether people in the area really believe in God or whether the religious culture in this region is based more in traditions than in convictions. Regular meeting with one another at the church is simply part of life in the area.

I recorded the highest level of heterogeneity for a model territory, in terms of the ways people deal with death, in Klobouky microregion. Significant differences exist in the manner of burial among the various municipalities of the micro-region. However, these differences and the reasons behind them make it possible to transcend local characteristics and factors, which impact the manner of burial. One of the factors is the existence of a church in the municipality. If a municipality does not have a church and has a funeral hall,

it is likely that the number of civil burials and cremations will be higher. In Morkůvky Municipality, the cremation rate is 95 %, even though it is only three kilometres from Klobouky u Brna, where the cremation rate is only 25 %. If a municipality has a church, but does not have a funeral hall, it can be expected that the number of church funerals and in-ground burials will dominate. From the remarks of Charvát (Charvát 2008), it is evident that even the political persuasions of municipal representatives and a municipality itself influence the manner of burial.

Although the average price of a burial, calculated for Czechia as a whole, is listed as 13 000 CZK, in the Klobouky model territory the average (and majority) price of burial is approximately 20 000 CZK. None of the burials in this area can be held, without flowers, musicians or a funeral feast. In most cases, nearly all of the residents of the municipality participate and the funeral is considered a big event, where family, friends and acquaintances gather (in Šitbořice and Dolní Bojanovice, 500 people participate in an average funeral service). It would be unthinkable for a family to conduct a burial without a funeral ceremony. According to Charvát (Charvát 2008), people in Moravia take great interest in what will be done with their loved ones, previous to burial (where they will be buried, or in other cases where they will be cremated). Customs and traditions, associated with burial, have been observed and retained until modern times. Only family members may serve as pallbearers and, in some villages, there is even a custom observed, in which a family member kicks the deceased's grave. The family's concern for the deceased and active participation in funeral ceremonies is clearly the greatest difference between rural areas and cities, in terms of the manner of dealing with death. This difference arises out of the greater role of the family and the increased significance of family values in rural areas than in cities as well as in Moravia as compared to Bohemia.

Interviews with involved individuals provided practical information for further necrogeographical research. Evaluation of the cremation rate in Czechia's regions, based on the share of cremations performed in the various crematoria from the total number of cremations performed in Czechia, is subject to a significant drawback. According to Charvát (Charvát 2008), certain crematoria, which have a lower number of cremations and whose capacity remains underutilized, set lower prices for mass cremations, involving a large number of dead bodies. Due to the financial advantages of such services, dead bodies are transported by truck, sometimes across the entire republic, to a distant crematorium (e.g. from Ústí nad Labem or from Znojmo to Tábor). Another problem arises in interpreting the symbolism in cemeteries over time – family graves tend to reduce the value of such analyses. The personalities of the owners and employees of funeral service companies and their approach also play a significant role in burial practices in the model territories.

The form and appearance of cemeteries in the model territories differ. In my opinion, cemeteries in Moravia have more of an organized and regular structure (ensured, in part, due to observance of the east-west positioning of graves), are in a better state of repair and are better cared-for and maintained. I also observed more care for gravesites, in Moravia, as well as more frequent occurrence of non-traditional types of headstones and statues in cemeteries. An increased frequency of divers inscriptions and photographs on headstones

is also noticeable in Moravia. According to the assumptions indicated above, Moravian cemeteries also exhibit more religious symbols, even though their number is decreasing.

4. CONCLUSION

The field research has confirmed the existence of great differences in the manner, in which people deal with death, in the model territories. These differences correspond, primarily, with religious differences between the various model territories. Even though it was only implemented in three model territories, findings from the field research indicate, approximately, how differentiation in the manner, in which people deal with death, in Czechia, is expressed. Again, the role of religion emerges as a decisive factor. With differing levels of religiosity, additional differences in necrogeographical aspects were discovered in the model territories. With an increasing level of religiosity:

I. the portion of church funerals increases
II. the portion of burials without a funeral ceremony decreases
III. the portion of unclaimed urns decreases
IV. burial participation increases
V. survivors' interest in the deceased increases
VI. traditions connected with death are maintained to a greater degree.

The large city factor is another decisive factor (differentiation does not arise on the basis of municipality size, in general, rather it is only the large cities that stand out). Yet another factor, which significantly impacts the manner, in which people deal with death at a local level, also becomes apparent. This factor is tradition[4]. Field research, especially the directed interviews with owners of funeral service companies, proved itself as a suitable method for necrogeographical research.

As early as the end of the 19th century, Czechia became involved in issues connected with the promotion and legalization of cremation. In particular, the high level of activity of Czech associations supporting cremation deserves credit, in my opinion, for the first impulse in the development of cremation in the country. The second impulse, supporting the increasing cremation rate in Czechia, came from the totalitarian communist regime. After 1 000 years of inhumation and merely 90 years since the legalization of cremation, cremation has become the dominant method of burial in Czech society. Since 1993, the cremation rate in Czechia has grown slightly if at all; it appears to be stagnating. In the future, I expect that the cremation rate will increase slightly until it stops changing altogether. The final maximum values that it will reach remain a question. It will clearly depend on future developments to Czech society as a whole – primarily on the future role of religion and traditions. The secularization of death is moving forward along with the secularization of society. In the 20th century, the secularization of death is manifest in the disappearance of rituals connected with death and in the prevalence of more intimate and family burials.

4 Tradition from the Latin "*traditio*" = to hand down or transfer, it means passing on language, opinions, forms of believing, feeling and acting, morals, establishments and social organizations from generation to generation. A tradition is something that represents both a custom and heritage for an individual (tradition = social custom and social heritage) (Ottův slovník naučný 1909)

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directed interviews

Mgr. Petr Martinka – Priest in the Nivnice Roman Catholic Parish.
interview conducted 1.7.2008, Nivnice
Josef Blaha – deputy mayor of Korytná Municipality.
interview conducted 1.7.2008, Korytná
Miroslav Adámek – owner of a funeral services company (Sušice).
interview conducted 10.7.2008, Sušice
Radim Charvát – owner of a funeral services company (Charvát, Klobouky u Brna).
interview conducted 17.7.2008, Klobouky u Brna

SECULAR EUROPE VERSUS RELIGIOUS AMERICA: EXPLAINING THE GAP

Hans KNIPPENBERG

Abstract: *Europe and the United States are very different as far as the significance of religion is concerned, both in the private and the public sphere. Whereas autochthon Europe is secularising to a great extent and any growth of religiousness is mainly a matter of immigrants, the United States is the scene of a vivid market of numerous churches, congregations and sects culminating in a high rate of people that belong to a church or religious community and that believe in God. The aim of this paper is to explain this gap between Europe and the United States on the basis of social science theory and theoretical insights derived from (historical) political and cultural geography. It is argued that a different kind of historical political territorialisation (from below in the US versus from above in Europe) in combination with culturally selective settlement (US) is at the centre of the explanation.*

Keywords: *geography of religion, political geography, cultural geography, Europe, United States, secularisation, territorialisation*

A RELIGIOUS GAP

When, just after the start of the new millennium, an American senator was asked how he evaluated the common values that bind Europe and America together, he answered: 'What common values, they don't even go to church' (cited in Lieven 2004, p. 8). In the same year during his campaign for president of the United States, George Bush was asked what his favourite philosopher was and he answered: 'Jesus, because he changed my hart' (cited in Micklethwait et al. 2005, p. 144). These statements illustrate the importance of religion in American society and the gap with Europe. For most of the European politicians religion is private matter not to be discussed in public. Many of them even do not adhere to a church or religious community. In the United States, it is unthinkable that an atheist could be elected as president. As Michael Kingsley wrote in his article in *Time* during the last campaign for presidency (September 17, 2007): 'These days presidential candidates are required to wear their religion on their sleeve. God is a personal adviser and inspiration to all of them' (cited in Guétin 2009, p. 1). The head-line of the article was significant: 'God as their running mate'.

Survey data support this picture. In 2001, 94 percent of the American people said that they believed in God and 46 percent said that they went to church on a weekly basis or even more often. Between 1981 and 2001, this proportion even increased with 3 percent points (Norris et al. 2004, p. 74). For comparison: In my own country, the Netherlands, the weekly or more church attendance declined from 26 percent in 1981 to 14 percent in

Prof.Dr. Em. Hans Knippenberg
University of Amsterdam. Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies. Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
e-mail: H.Knippenberg@uva.nl., Tel. +31 20 525 4062. Fax +31 20 525 4051

2001 (Ibidem, 90). According to recent surveys 61 to 66 percent of the Dutch population do not belong to any church or religious community (Sengers 2005; Becker et al. 2006; Bernts et al. 2007). Figure 1 shows the decline in Dutch church adherence since 1880 (see for more details Knippenberg 1992, pp. 227-243; 1998). In 2006, only 40 percent of the Dutch population had a traditional belief in God, that means in the sense churches or religious communities belief in God (Bernts et al. 2007, pp. 63-64). Most other European countries are a little bit more religious, but show the same trend (Norris et al. 2004, pp. 84-94; Knippenberg 2005). In general Europe is far more secularised than the United Sates.



Figure 1 Percentage of the Dutch population that do not adhere to any church or religious group, 1880-2006

Note: After 1930: upper line represents measurement by two-step questioning (Do you regard yourself as belonging to a church or religious group? If yes, which church or religious group is that?). Lower line represents measurement by one-step questioning (Which church or religious group do you adhere to? Answer options include 'none').

Moreover this gap between Europe and the United States is already old. When in 1831 Alexis de Tocqueville was sent to America by the French government in order to examine the American prison system, he fortunately did not confine himself to that prison system. During seven months he visited large parts of America. The first thing that struck his imagination was the religious character of the country and its political implications, which differed so much from his home country. In his own words: 'In France, I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions. But in America I found they were intimately united and that they reigned in common over the same country' (De Tocqueville 1998, p. 121).

How could we explain this longstanding difference between Europe and the United States? The aim of this paper is to answer this question.

EXISTING THEORIES

The classical secularisation paradigm considered secularisation as a consequence of modernisation, based on ideas of Max Weber concerning a growing rationality (*die Entzauberung der Welt*),[1] or from Emile Durkheim on functional differentiation, that is the fragmentation of social life as specialised institutions are created to handle functions previously carried out by one institution, in this case the church (see for the classical secularisation paradigm Wilson 1969, 1982 and 1998; and more recently Bruce 2002). Once, religion covered the whole of society as a kind of *sacred canopy* (in the words of Berger 1967), now religion has been reduced to only one of many domains of modern society and has been privatised to a large extent. Also the rise of new secular ideologies such as socialism and nationalism was considered to have contributed to a declining importance of religion, both on the individual and societal level. In that respect, one should not only think of the developments in the former communist world, but also in the West (concerning the Netherlands, see for instance Kruijt 1933, pp. 175-211).

According to the classical secularisation paradigm, it all started with the Reformation, although the rationalisation process has older roots, which according to some scholars can be traced back to the birth of monotheism (Berger 1969, p. 115; Bruce 2002, pp. 5-7). Reformation removed the institution of the church as a source of authority between God and man, eliminated the ritual and sacramental manipulation of God and so unintentionally encouraged individualisation and fragmentation (Bruce 2002, pp. 10-12). Moreover, the Reformation fostered the growth of literacy; a protestant should be able to read the Bible himself, which benefited modernisation. Also the protestant ethic, which encouraged industrial capitalism and economic growth, contributed to modernisation.

How plausible these explanations were in the European context, they could not explain why a modern nation such as the United States remained so religious or became even more religious in certain periods. That is why American sociologists developed a different kind of theory based on the principles of a market (Stark et al. 1985 and 1987; Stark et al. 1994; Finke et al. 1996; Finke et al. 1998; Stark 1999; Stark et al. 2000). In fact, they assumed a stable demand of religious 'products'. They explained differences in church going and religiosity by differences in the supply side of the religious market. A strong regulation of the religious market (for instance in case of a state church, that by its monopoly prohibits the freedom of choice of individuals) and a small diversity of the supply side (i.e. no competition between the religious 'firms') should conduce secularisation. Because the United States are characterised by a wide variety of churches and sects and moreover (in contrast to most European countries) there is no state church of otherwise dominant church, a optimal situation of something for everybody has developed, that prevented secularisation.

Although these market theories experienced much empirical support in the American context, there still was much criticism both on theoretical and empirical grounds (Bruce 1999 and 2002; Norris et al. 2004; Wunder 2005; Gooren 2006). A first point of criticism concerned the rational choice paradigm that was behind it. Like many economic theories also the religious market model is based on the assumption that individuals make rational choices in order to reach an optimum between its profits and losses. In practise, this

1 Max Weber coined the term secularisation in his essay *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* from 1904 (Swatos et al. 1999, p. 209)

assumption does not hold, because no one is able to consider all relevant factors and because the knowledge on which the choice has been made is selective and strongly influenced by tradition and culture. In the words of Steve Bruce (1999, p. 126) – a prominent adherent of the classical secularisation paradigm – : 'One of the most curious features of the rational choice model is that it treats actors without identity and history.' Also the maximisation of profits was criticised. Again a quote from Steve Bruce (Ibidem, p. 157): 'I do not think people believe in God because they get a good return on that belief. Most people belief because they are socialised into a culture of belief.' As a geographer, I should say: market theorists neglect the cultural and political geographic context that has been developed in the past.

A second point of criticism concerns the one-sided orientation on the supply side of the religious market. Probably this orientation has to do with the wish to counter the classical secularisation paradigm that on the contrary focuses on a decline in religious demand. By assuming a constant demand of religion individuals are reduced to 'passive recipients of collectively created goods', as Bankston (2003, p. 165) once wrote. From social science research we know that religious choices are affected by several individual and group characteristics such as education level, occupation, racial or ethnic minority status, socialization by family and peers, individual life events, et cetera. None of these characteristics are distributed in a constant fashion across history or geography (Ibidem).

Apart from its theoretical content, the religious market theories has been criticised on empirical grounds. Especially the from these theories derived hypothesis that how more religious diversity, how more religiosity and religious participation, is not supported in the European context (Chaves et al. 2001; Wunder 2005, pp. 175-186). The main feature of the changing religious landscape of Europe is the combination of growing religious plurality caused by immigration and crumbling religious monopolies on the one side, and continuing secularisation on the other (Henkel et al. 2005). Thus, growing diversity is attended with growing secularisation, just the opposite of what religious market theories expect. Also in earlier phases of secularisation we do not find the expected relationship. Recently, my colleague Sjoerd de Vos and I could show that in the Netherlands in 1930, there was a positive correlation between the religious diversity of local communities and the rate of secularisation, measured as the proportion of the people that did not adhere to any church or religious community, in stead of the negative correlation that market theorists would expect (Knippenberg et al. 2008). Besides, this result was consistent with the classical secularisation paradigm, since religious diversity correlated positively with indicators of modernisation.

Also the assumption of the market theorists that there is a constant need for religion misses a firm empirical basis. Recently Norris and Inglehart (2004) made a courageous effort in analysing statistically the world wide differences in religiosity. No need to say that they experienced many methodological problems. Nevertheless, they made plausible that their data did not support a supply theory on secularisation. Consequently, they reject the notion of a stable demand of religion in all parts of the world. Instead they find a diminishing demand of religion in the more developed parts of the world, and a constant high level or even growing level of religiosity in other parts. In order to explain these differences, they developed the theory of existential security. Growing up in a society with

a large amount of insecurity would lead to a relatively high level of religiosity and vice versa. The relatively high level of secularisation in the modern (West-)European welfare states can thus be explained by the relatively high level of existential security. On the other hand, the relatively high level of religiosity of many countries in the South, but even of the United Sates with their less developed social security systems, could be explained by a relatively high level of existential insecurity.

The advantage of such an approach is that it takes into consideration the socio-economic and political context. The importance of this context becomes also clear when we follow the sociologist of religion Jose Casanova (Casanova 2001, p. 426) when he points out that the discussion on secularisation between American and European sociologists of religion is in an impasse: 'The orthodox model works relatively well for Europe but not for America, the American paradigm works for the US but not for Europe.' That means that both theoretical models have a limited empirical reach. He elaborates that further by – I almost should say as a good political geographer – pointing at processes of territorialisation in the past, which at the same time included a territorial embedding of religion. This territorialisation had to do with the rise of a system of modern nation states, that recognised each other's sovereignty over the territories concerned. The territorial embedding of religion was most influential there where state churches developed. The well-know principle of the Augsburg Peace Treaty of 1555, in 1648 confirmed by the Westphalian Peace Treaty, *cuius regio, eius religio* was the basis. *Cuius regio, eius religio* means that the ruler decides on the religion of the people on his territory.

My colleague Gertjan Dijkink (2008, p. 181) analysed this process of territorialisation in three dimensions: c*losure, control* and *identity. Closure* represents the delimitation of territory, including all arrangements that define the relations with the outside world; *control* represents the influence over persons, activities and resources on the territory; *identity* represents the ideology that united the people and legitimates the power and authority over the territory. The first two dimensions concern state formation, while the latter concerns nation building.

The territorial embedding of religion meant that each state developed its own relationship between church and state, which in Europe induced a rich variety (Davie 2000, p. 15). On the one hand there are states where state and church were strongly separated such as France and to a lesser degree the Netherlands. On the other hand, there are countries with a state church such as the Scandinavian countries, England and the countries in Eastern Europe where orthodox churches dominated. In between, there are countries with a mix of both systems (Robbers 1995, pp. 352-354). Those variety induced a partitioning of Europe not only in a lutheran bloc in the North, a catholic bloc in the South and a orthodox bloc in the East with mixed countries in between like the Netherlands with a Calvinist oriented majority and a catholic minority, but induced also a further differentiation in the catholic bloc, as the differences between France, Spain, Italy, Bavaria and Poland illustrate (Madeley 2003; Knippenberg 2006; GeoJournal special issue 2006, vol. 67, nr 4). A good illustration of those differences is the recent study of De Busser (2009) on the political territorial meaning of three catholic places of pilgrimage in Spain (Santiago de Compostela), Bavaria (Altötting) and Poland (Jasna Góra). This partitioning of Europe also had consequences for the level of secularisation. Protestant nations secularised more than catholic ones and within the catholic bloc: France secularised more than Italy.

If historical state formation and nation building have been so important for the religious differentiation within Europe, are these processes also the key for the difference between Europe and the United States?

TERRITORIALISATION FROM BELOW AND FROM ABOVE

American society has often been depicted as *A Nation of Immigrants*, which also is the title of a well-known volume written by president John F. Kennedy (1964) and published after his death. Still, this image is at least partly wrong and in a way deceptive too. The first groups of people that reached America from Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were not immigrants, but settlers (Huntington 2004, pp. 38-46). The fundamental difference is that settlers create a new society in an empty area, while immigrants move from one society to another. Consequently, those first settlers had a disproportionate impact on the culture and institutions of that colonist society. The cultural geographer Wilbur Zelinsky (1992, pp. 23-24) terms this phenomenon the 'doctrine of first effective settlement'. Of course, there were Indian tribes in sparsely populated America, but they were simply driven away or passed away because of violence or diseases, that were brought by the Europeans. They never functioned as a potential host society. In that sense initially American society was not a nation of immigrants, but a community, or better a number of separate communities of settlers, who came to the New World in groups and would unite into the United States of America after the American Revolution.

And those first groups of settlers had a number of specific features, that were decisive for the historical development of the American culture and identity. The vast majority was British, white and protestant. And important for our subject: they were protestant of a dissident kind. It was the opportunity to hold in freedom dissident religious ideas and bring these in practise collectively, that encouraged many dissident protestant communities to cross the ocean, to start with the puritan *Pilgrim Fathers*, who reached the American coast with their ship the *Mayflower* in 1620. They compared themselves with the Israelites of the Old Testament. America was the New Jerusalem, the Promised Land, far away from the corrupt world of the Old Europe, which in their view included the roman-catholic and Anglican churches (Guétin 2009, pp. 19-20). They rejected the Episcopal hierarchy of these churches. Being the word of God, the Bible was their only source of authority.

Also in later times, America functioned as a 'asylum for the oppressed' to quote a well-known slogan from the American Revolution (Ibidem). Half way the nineteenth century, for instance, the Dutch dissident *Afgescheidenen*, who had separated from the Dutch Reformed Church, were overrepresented in the emigration into America (Stokvis 1977; Krabbendam 2006). Under the leadership of well-known Dutch ministers such as Scholte and Van Raalte hundreds of my fellow country men departed to the Promised Land and settled predominantly in Michigan and to a lesser extent in Iowa. From eighteenth century Switzerland and Germany, to give another imaginative example, Anabaptists crossed the ocean to found their still existing Amish communities in Pennsylvania (see Hostetler 1968 for more details).

However, most early settlers came from Great Britain. That appeared to be true at the first census after the thirteen existing colonies had conquered their independence from England in 1776 and had united in a confederation and later on in a federation (see Figure 2). Besides, Old-Testamentary symbolism also played a part in this Union. The 13

colonies were compared with the tribes of Israel. The Bible mentions 12 tribes, but the tribe of Joseph had been subdivided into Ephraim and Manasseh (Dijkink 2008, p. 50). According to that first American census, which was held in 1790, the total population of the United States – Indians excluded – counted almost 4 million people, among them 700,000 slaves. Circa 80 percent of the white population was British (60 percent English), the other 20 percent were largely German or Dutch. No fewer than 98 percent of that white population was protestant, predominantly of a Calvinist or Baptist kind (Huntington 2004, p. 44; Bruinsma 1998, p. 51).



Figure 2 The development of the United States of America until 1820

The protestant settler character of early American society also had its impact on what has been called 'the American Creed' and what can be considered as a second cornerstone of American identity: their belief in the essential dignity of the individual human being; in the fundamental equality of all men; in the inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and fair opportunity; connected with a fundamental distrust in governmental interference and in hierarchical relationships in general (Myrdal 1944, vol.1, p. 3; Huntington 2004, pp. 66-69). The principles of the Creed have remained remarkable stable over time until the present day, and commanded the widespread agreement and support of the American people, however practice might deviate from it, as the history of the Afro-Americans clearly illustrates.

The American Creed reflects important elements of Protestantism; according to Samuel Huntington (2004, p. 69), it is 'Protestantism without God'. The protestant emphasis on

the role of the individual in achieving knowledge of God directly from the Bible fostered individualism and individual responsibility for success or failure. According to the well-known studies of Geert Hofstede on differences in national cultures among IBM employees in the 1980s, the Americans had by far the highest scores on the individualism index, followed by the Australians and the British (Hofstede 1980; 1991, p. 73). The Creed also reflects the protestant work ethic. An international comparative study among industrialised countries in 1997 showed that on average Americans worked 350 more hours per year than Europeans. In 1999, 60 percent of American teenagers worked three times the average of other industrialised countries (Huntington 2004, p. 72).

The rejection of government intervention – 'the less government the better' as Bryce formulated it already in the 1890s (cited in Huntington 2004, p. 67) – is a reflection of the protestant aversion to hierarchically organised churches. Freedom of religion in the American sense means the opportunity to voluntary found, maintain and disseminate local churches, congregations or sects independent of any Episcopal hierarchy or central government. That is a large difference with Europe, where in most countries if not a state church, than at least a dominant church, supported by the state, occurred and in most cases still occurs, be it the roman catholic church in the South, the Lutheran church in the Scandinavian countries, the roman catholic or evangelical church in parts of Germany, the Anglican church in England or the orthodox churches in the East and Southeast of Europe. Even in the Netherlands with traditionally a large extent of religious freedom, the old Calvinist church had a privileged position connected to the state for a long time, which can even yet be recognised in the church membership of the Royal Family.

Nothing of this kind developed in the United States. Even the roman catholic church, that reached America through the immigration of the Irish and Germans, adapted itself to the existing American – that is protestant – society. The *roman* catholic church changed in an *American* catholic church including its attitudes, practices, organization, and behaviour (Huntington 2004, p. 95). Or as an African observer noted in the 1990s: 'American catholics are a nuisance for Rome just because they are … well, so protestant' (cited in Huntington 2004, p. 98).

Against this background, we must consider the separation between church and state, which was laid down in the American Constitution after Independence and differs fundamentally from the separation of church and state as was developed in France after the Revolution. Whereas the French separation of church and state was meant to free the state from the influence of the powerful roman catholic church, the American separation, on the contrary, was meant to free church and religion from state influence. The First Amendment of the American Constitution reads: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof' (Wald et al. 2007, p. 69). Although both French and American Revolutions embrace the principles of freedom and equality, the French Revolution was clearly anti-religion, mindful of the often cited statement of Voltaire: 'écrasez l'infâme' ('crush the infamous', with which he meant the Roman Catholic Church; cited in Berger et al. 2008, p. 49). The American Revolution was clearly pro-religion: for the Americans the freedom *to* believe was at stake in stead off the freedom *from* belief of the French (Ibidem 2008, p. 28).

Apart from a constitutional aspect there is also an organisational aspect. All large European state churches or dominant churches are organised territorially, divided in

bishoprics or other regional territorial units, or in parishes or communities as far as local units are concerned. In many cases these territorial church units overlapped with political units and had civil functions as well. For a long time, the registration of birth, mortality and marriages, for example, was a task of local church units, in Sweden even until very recently (1991; Ibidem 2008, p. 45). Higher church authorities created the territorial division with these local church communities. The local religious communities in America are in sharp contrast to this. They are founded from below by those who voluntarily joined each other, the so-called congregations (Ibidem, pp. 29-30; Warner 1993, pp. 1066-1067). As a consequence, a rich local variety of competing congregations developed giving rise to a unique religious landscape (Bruinsma 1998; Zelinsky 2001). The continuing influx of groups of immigrants, who brought their own religion from home, strengthened this congregational model. They often used religion as a means for grounding solidarities and identities. All groups together fostered the visibility and self-evidence of religion in the American society. Because each congregation was self supporting (they got no government subsidies), the active participation and continuing care for survival became an essential part of the daily functioning. Thus, a vivid religious market was born with religious entrepreneurs, 'product innovation' and competing 'firms'.

As a consequence of the historical monopoly of the European churches, Europeans regard their churches more as public utilities rather than competing firms. The majority look on their churches with benign benevolence as useful social institutions, which are likely to need at one time or another in their lives. It simply does not occur to them that the churches might cease to exist but for their active participation. Only in those countries, where the church was not connected to state power, but to the people in resistance to foreign authority, such as in Ireland before independence and in Poland before the fall of communism, roman Catholicism became such an essential element of national identity, that these nations still are among the most religious of Europe (Berger et al. 2008, pp. 35-37).

Finally, in the United States, the protestant work ethic and the emphasis on the individual responsibility concerning success or failure shaped a culture in which the notion of a welfare state had considerably less support than in Europe. There were hardly any socialist political movements or parties, or these were not comparable in size and impact with their European counterparts. Consequently a welfare state in the European sense is missing and dependence on what are often referred to as 'government handouts' carries a stigma unmatched in other industrialised countries (Huntington 2004, pp. 69-75). That means that, in practise, many Americans are dependent on churches and congregations, when they, in case of illness or unemployment, are no longer able to care for themselves. In Europe, the state is caring 'from the cradle to the grave' and has taken over the traditional functions of churches in this respect almost completely.

CONCLUSIONS

In the United States a kind of territorialising *from below* has taken place, which was strongly influenced by the religious, and in particular dissident protestant culture of the first groups of settlers. That culture was further elaborated in the civil American Creed, that emphasised individual freedom and responsibility, and distrusted government interference and in general hierarchical relationships, including collective welfare arrangements. That

culture also had its impact in the relationship between state and religion, which were formally separated, but not in order to free the state from religion (as in France), but in order to free religion from state interference and create maximal freedom of religion, which offered an ideal opportunity for religious entrepreneurs to start their own religious firm and extend it in mutual competition.

In Europe, on the contrary, there was territorialisation *from above*. After the roman catholic church had lost its monopoly during the Reformation, religion became embedded territorially according to the *cuius regio, eius religio* principle. Territorially organised state churches or at least dominant churches followed, which were functioning as a kind of public utilities, that gradually lost its functions to the rising welfare states. Secular ideologies such as socialism and nationalism inspired the resistance against the vested order and also against the privileged churches that were connected with that order. Industrialisation and urbanisation loosened the people from their traditional geographic and consequently also religious environment including its social control. Secularisation was the consequence. Of course, also in the US were industrialisation and urbanisation, but the vivid religious market, that was created from below offered an attractive and varied supply of active congregations, thus preventing secularisation.

Finally, putting the difference between the Unites States and Europe in a global context, there appears a remarkable phenomenon. For a long time, in the eyes of the Europeans, the United States were an anomaly in the Western World. As a logical part of modernisation, secularising was considered to be normal. Nowadays, things have turned around. Most scientists of religion consider secularised Europe the exemption in a world in which religion has taken a prominent part, be it the growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America, the Pacific Rim, but also parts of Africa, the Islam in the Middle East and other parts of Africa, roman Catholicism in the Philippines, or orthodox Christianity in Russia (Berger 1999; Davie 2002; Berger et al. 2008). The interesting point is, that as far as religion is growing in Europe, this growth is related to immigration. In a way, the religious world is moving to Europe, these days. This includes not only the Islam, that experienced a spectacular growth in Europe, but also different branches of Christendom. The roles are reversed. As in colonial times Dutch (and other European) missionaries departed to Africa in order to preach the word of God, so, nowadays, for instance Ghanese evangelists come to the Netherlands to let germ the seed of Christendom in the spiritual desert, that, in their eyes, the Netherlands has become (Ter Haar 1998; Davie 2002, pp. 84-111). For the time being, they achieve more success within the group of fellow immigrants, than within the autochthon Dutch population. The latter is still secularising further and as far as they are spiritually interested, they are resorting more to New Age forms of spirituality, which often comes to a search for the divine self. The interest in these kinds of alternative spirituality has certainly increased in the last decennia (Aupers 2005).

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COBWEBS IN PEWS – RELIGION, IDENTITY AND SPACE IN WESTERN GEMER REGION IN CENTRAL SLOVAKIA

Juraj MAJO

Abstract: *This paper analyzes changes of religious identity, religious life in formerly one of the most intellectually and culturally flourishing regions in Slovakia – Gemer. This region has been one of the most prosperous regions in the Hungarian Empire, mostly thanks to mining tradition, but now has become one of the poorest regions in Slovakia. From the cultural point of view, this region with strong Lutheran tradition in its Slovak part has undergone many changes in religious identity in past 50 years. We attempt to analyze changes in religious identity especially in the region of Western part of Gemer between towns Hnúšťa and Revúca with respect to changes in religious structure of the population, number of believers according to church statistics, intensity of religious services in communities and age structure of believers. Generally, the processes in communities are similar: aging of adherents, irregular worship services, poor condition of church building, secular usage of parsonages and former church school buildings, or in worse situations, such buildings are abandoned and devastated.*

Key words: *Gemer, religious landscape, religion, Lutheran, cultural geography, identity, marginality*

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that Slovakia is considered to be religious country, even in comparison with neighboring countries the level of religiousness and share of people declaring themselves to be members of some denomination is still high. Overall, the years of long lasting socialist regime had not destroyed deep and mighty roots of the connection with religion in many parts of human life. Not only in rites of passage, that were more or less conducted and "blessed" not only by state offices, but, especially in rural communities the assistance of local church community was inevitable and in many cases expected. Even church attendance and intensity of communal religious life in rites, services, or in some cases even pilgrimages has remained quite numerous as well.

Such intensity of religious life was much lower in urban areas. Intensive urbanization in socialism period broke up the traditional ties with religiosity and in large urban blocks faith melted and usually became only sentiment. Cities then became points of spreading secularization and abandonment from church and religious life. Complicated cultural map of Slovakia has revealed not only points, but region, where religion lost its stable position in colorful range of cultural identity or identities. This region lies in the center of Slovakia,

Juraj Majo, Mgr.
PhD. student, Comenius University, Faculty of science,
Department of Human Geography and Demogeography
Mlynská dolina, 842 15 Bratislava
tel. 02/ 60296 521, 0908 195 054, e-mail: majo@fns.uniba.sk, juraj.majo@gmail.com

and from various point of views is outstanding. It is Gemer region – unique region on the borders with Hungary with rich and proud history and multicultural content not only from the point of view of religion, but also from the point of ethnicity and social structure. This region is today known to be one of the poorest and is considered marginal (Dzupinova, 2008, pp. 149-151) according to several figures and researches. Economical and social marginality is completed by marginality of religion in this region. This presupposition is proved and became more evident in the most recent Census in 2001.

Historically, Gemer region consisted of three main religious groups – Lutherans, Calvinists and Roman Catholics. While Hungarians in this region declared themselves Catholics and Calvinist, Slovaks were mainly Lutherans. In this paper we focus more on changes of the position of the Lutheran Church in central western part of Gemer region combining official data from recent and historical censuses as well as internal church data including number of adherents, and intensity of church services in communities. The choice of our research region is based on researches in published monograph of marginality (Džupinová et al 2008) and peripheral regions of Slovakia to which we have added neighboring communities lying in hilly area of Gemer in Slovak ethnic area. This research region more or less covers the area of western Gemer region (according to Zubriczky et al. 2005 p 21) where mining areas lie, just like it is adjusted to the boundaries of historical Gemer Lutheran Church parishes and deanery according to statistical church directory (so called Schematismus) from 1838. Due to several differences we have excluded urban communities from this analysis, and focused on rural communities exclusively. We also combine two levels of public administration settlement division. For some analyzes we use the level of municipalities, and for some analyzes, especially with historical content we use the level of communities. Most of them belong to Rimavská Sobota district, some municipalities in north-east belong to Revúca district.

Researches in changes of religious landscape are quite rare in Slovak geography of religion. Due to stable and relatively high level of religiosity in this country, there were no strong motivations to analyze that part of religious geography yet. We might see some analogue with researches in Czech Sudetenland (researches in this area see in Havlíček at al. 2007) with historically different evolution, but consequences might have many common aspects with Gemer region in Slovakia, that would emerge in several decades later.

SECULARIZATION PROCESS IN GEMER

Although the process of religiosity level decline had emerged after WW II and after coming of the socialist regime, there might be some hints in the past indicating the possibility of future more secular development. There is evidence, that after WWI, there has been quite popular founding of communist party associations in communities (Bolfik, 1971). Long history of Communism in this region including its flourishing 40 year long period is sustained even in today´s times. According to election results, the number of votes for Communists in this region is far above the national level. According to data (Fig.1) (Fig 2) there are few communities, where Communist party was the party with highest number of votes in community[1]. Such inclination to Communist ideas that were

1 We use the election results from year 2002 due to the fact, that in this year Communist party acquired highest share of votes in post-socialism history of Slovakia (above 6 %, which meant, that this party joined National Council for the following 4 years).

especially after 1948 connected with atheism in more or less intensive forms have strongly influenced Gemer in the range that no other region in Slovakia reached.



Fig 1. Communist party election share in 2002 (national share 6%)
Source: http://www.statistics.sk/volby2002/webdata/slov/tab/tab10.xls

Fig. 2 Established local Communist parties in 1920s
Source: Bolfík 1977

Why such strong inclination toward Communism? (Tab1) (Fig. 3)The explanation is not simple, but we can find roots in strong iron or magnesite mining tradition of some parts of Gemer such as Lubeník, Chyžné, Mníšany – Magnezitovce, Jelšava, Rákoš, Sirk, Železník, Červeňany, Turčok, Ploské, Rovné (Zubriczky et al. 2005, pp. 106-133). Mining was the first non-agricultural occupation possibility that was even organized, and that occupation was connected with strong social accent (social apartments, leisure time facilities, as it can be seen in some villages such as Železník). Due to social organization of this industry (trade union) as well as economic crisis in twenties and thirties has produced such political left-winged outlook. The possibility towards accepting such ideas was also caused by relatively liberal environment of Lutheran communities. Such atmosphere then easily caused people to slowly withdraw religion from the cultural identity. We can find salient resource reflecting such changes of cultural content of identity in chronicles of local communities. For example, the chronicle of community Rovné (Kronika obce Rovné) states in 1958 where the writer states that "inhabitants were not extraordinarily devoted to religion; just elderly keenly adhere to religious customs". Changes after 1948 in religious situation in this community were so intensively accepted, that, as the writer in 1960 states, "thanks to education process no child was enrolled at religious classes." (Kronika obce Rovné, p. 59)

Tab 1. Population dynamics of western Gemer between 1880-2001

	1880-1930	**1930-2001**
Lutherans	**-9 %**	**-68 %**
Roman Catholics	**64 %**	**11 %**
Total population	**0 %**	**-35 %**

Source: Censuses 1880,1930, and 2001



Fig. 3 Population dynamics of western Gemer between 1880-2001
Source: Censuses 1880,1930, and 2001

Although religion seems not to be the most important factor in culture of this region anymore, in the past Lutheranism had played an important role in forming the intellectual and educational face not only in local communities, but many times had national importance. Many intellectual leaders of nation worked here as ministers or at least teachers (Dobšinský, Bartholomaeides, etc.), in local town Revúca was founded the first Slovak grammar school in 1862, where many future leaders of the nation studied, although it had to be closed very soon, in 1874. Beside churches, almost every community had teacher and school building, churches and parsonages were usually the most honored buildings in village. This started to change in the second half of 20th century. Some of the mines ended up their work, and due to more difficult accessibility, depopulation process slowly progressed. As communities were shrinking, there were less people to sustain the grand church buildings and many started to decay. This process continues until now and creates specific outlook not only of religious landscape, but communal, and social landscape as well.

The most expressible mean of proving the intensity of secularization process in western Gemer region are data from censuses, especially from the recent census, that was performed more than 10 years after fall of socialism showing more or less stable situation in religious life reflecting previous year of freedom deficiency that lasted for few decades. If we consider numbers showing quantitative changes in this field, there can be seen slow decrease of Lutherans starting already between years 1880 – 1910, although the number of total population was increasing, just like the numbers of Roman Catholics. This increase can be explained either by growing number of migrating miners or growing number of Romas, even though its religiosity is usually different in its essence (see for example Podolinská 2007) and has different way of expression. Highest decrease is evident in the second half of century. Number of Lutherans dropped almost to the level of ¾ of size in 1930. This is not only the context of depopulation (as it is seen in decrease of total population number), but as well as aging process due to less intensive transmission of religious identity upon new coming generations.

The most interesting are data of the share of non affiliated people in communities. The share of non church affiliated of the region is, as expected, higher than average. Almost 1/3 of (Tab2) the population belongs to that group, while national share is 13 %.

Tab 2. Non – church affiliated population in 2001

	Total population	**Share of non-church affiliated (%)**
Bratislava	**428 672**	**29,3**
Košice	**236 093**	**19,4**
Železník – Šrobárka	**233**	**65,2**
Turčok	**244**	**54,5**

Source: Census 2001

But within the region there are spatial differences; some communities, even of Lutheran origin have share of non affiliated below average, even below 5 %, on the other hand, there are communes with share above 40 %. The highest concentration of that non-religious

group is in mine (Fig 4) (Fig 5) communities that were founded for monofunctional purpose. One of such community has the share over 65 % (Železník-Šrobárka). Among the autochthonous communities such share of non-affiliated has Turčok (54 %). The last mentioned community has even church, yet with irregular services there, since the figures of the share of not affiliated is very high here, exceeding the share in the largest cities in Slovakia.



Fig 4. Share of non church affiliated in 2001
Source: Census 2001



Fig 5. Share of Lutherans in 2001
Source: Census 2001

AGING OF THE ADHERENTS

Besides progressing process of secularization, there is evident aging of the Lutherans in this region. Overall, Lutherans in Slovakia are the church with the highest share of old adherents (Hluchá 2006). Believers in this region are even older than average. (Tab 3) Oldest Lutheran communities have mean age of its believers over 60 years, but those communes are older generally and have very few inhabitants, such as Poproč with 27 inhabitants, or Budikovany with 25 inhabitants. More expressive figure about aging is the difference between average age of Lutherans in community and average age of the whole community. The highest difference is 20 years older Lutheran community than total population. Such examples are evident in Turčok (community with one of the highest share of church-non affiliated) or Šivetice. Almost no differences demonstrate communities with high share of Lutheran or those with not that intensive process of secularization (Ratkovské Bystré, Španie Pole, Lipovec).

Tab 3. Comparison of mean age in 2001

	Lutherans	**Total population**
Western Gemer	**45,9**	**38,4**
Slovakia	**42,0**	**36,1**

Source: Census 2001

RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE IN GEMER

According to discussed processes of secularization that this region has undergone, there is evident that religious landscape must somehow reflect the status of religion for individuals and for community as well. Places such as churches, sometimes adjacent ecclesiastical buildings such as parsonages, schools and other buildings played role in constructing and maintaining the boundaries that sustained religious identities and communities. Mostly in the past even people not belonging to the religious community paid respect towards such places and recognized them as being the important site of the whole community as well. Churches, parsonages and schools were one of the most, if not the only, cultural sites in village and their status was usually confirmed by their central position in communities. In most of the communities in this part of Gemer region we find churches and schools on central squares of villages. It seems that this central status of church is only spatial, cultural and transcendental centrality of church and religion in nowadays society is doubtful. Nevertheless, there must be stated, that the status of church building does not always mean that religious community disappeared, but due to depopulation processes became villages much smaller as a whole. So, there could be identified two "strokes" to religious identity of western Gemer and its religious landscape. First is secularization that is strengthened by depopulation process. Therefore, not only church buildings, but also other secular buildings in communes together with private houses show signs of decay and progressing vacancy or aging of facades.

We can portray few pattern examples of the outlook of religious landscape in this researched region. Not only churches, but moreover subsidiary church buildings show more intensive signs of decay and the status of community. Mostly due to depopulation,

and secularization, many parishes became too small to be able to sustain own ministers. Again, the most crucial years emerged during socialism. The last church directory and statistics from 1955 show no changes in this area so far, but statistics that was published 50 years later show vast changes. The only decline of church parish before years of socialism is Kyjatice. This community has undergone the most rapid change in religious structure, where the share of Catholics grew from 10.5 % in 1921 to 55.5 % in 1930 (Tišliar 2008) and therefore shrinking Lutheran parish had to perish. According to directory in 1955, it was already attached to neighboring parish. In that time another parishes remained intact, just like it had been for more than 100 years. In 50 years the situation changed a lot and from 14 parishes and 14 ministers inhabiting this area, only 2 parsonages were able to sustain its ministers in 2008. We describe physical status of some of them.

Kyjatice – (Fig 6) first declining parish with unused parsonage in this region, already before year 1950. Historical gothic church is in good state, but parsonage is unused and ruined. Buildings adjacent to church (probably former church school) are converted to secular use and inhabited.

Fig 6. First uninhabited parsonage in western Gemer – Kyjatice (status in 2009)

Brádno – (Fig 7) parsonage remained in church property, it is in well state, and rented as an apartment. On the other hand, only ruins remained from the church school, that has been later on used as state elementary school too (see picture). Church is in state of renovation (new roof in 2009) but requires more investments due to its position on marshy soil.

Fig. 7. Parsonage in Brádno with ruins of former church schol in the middle (status in 2009)

Rybník – (Fig 8) community intensively inhabited by Romas and according to statistics, there is only 13 Lutherans in 2001. Parsonage is used for secular purposes (private apartment), but the physical status of the church is the worst in region. Gothic church is located out of village on hill in cemetery. It has not been used for years and altar was removed to museum in Kosice other parts of interior were preserved, although organ is completely destroyed. There have been attempts to save that unique church by organizing workcamp in 2008 with the help of local authorities (http://www.evanjelik.sk/node/3742). Volunteers including ministers performed some minor but helpful renovation works.

Fig. 8 Unused and abandoned church in Rybník (status in 2007)

Ratková – (Fig 9) former town is also inhabited mostly by Romas. Gothic church in the centre of square is used monthly, and is in quite good condition. Evidently monumental parsonage is abandoned and devastated probably since 1970. The local authorities planned to use the abandoned parsonage as retirement home, but evidently they had not succeeded. In the vicinity of church and parsonage, there is old two storey church school with Latin sign saying it was built thanks to the diligence of Ratková citizens. The majesty of the school building proves the position of education in this community in the past. Just like in the case of Rybnik, there are NGO activities of people who have roots in this town. This association bought the old parsonage here, and with the help of national collection have plans to renovate it (www.nasaratkova.estranky.cz)

Fig. 9 Parsonage in Ratková (status in 2007)

Šivetice – another community with Roma majority, church needs renovation, parsonage located on central square is abandoned and partly destroyed (no windows, doors). Village is interesting from another point of view. There is located Roman-Catholic Romanesque rotunda. Since there is no established Catholic community (although according to last census there are 178 Catholics), it is more-less devastated. Thank to state investments renovation started this year. Similar rotunda and its circumstances can be found in neighboring commune Prihradzany (Fig 10). No catholic community and just like partly abandoned appearance can be found here as well. Those two examples in Šivetice and Prihradzany are the most remarkable examples of contribution of Roman Catholic church and its sacred places to the religious landscape of western Gemer.

Fig. 10 Roman Catholic rotunda in Šivetice (status in 2008 before renovation has started) Intensity of religious life in western Gemer

There is no doubt that poor condition of churches, decreasing numbers of believers might have consequences in lower intensity of church life. The most evident figure in this case is the intensity of Sunday church services. Since there are only few ministers that have to serve many communities that are even low in participants, the church life has been reduced. Therefore, services are held only once a month in most of the congregations. Larger and less remote communities have services even twice a month, more remote and with smaller number of adherents have rather irregular services few times a year. (Fig 11) (Fig 12) (Fig 13) What can such intensity of religious services indicate? According to L. Kong there is no doubt that as long as people pray in the same place, there is the feeling of belonging together as a community, although the same worship place does not always entail a feeling of integration and community of worshippers (Kong 2005, p. 372). This can be partially true considering especially rural communities. On the other hand, worship services are the only more or less regular expression of common belonging or at least indicate gathering for one common purpose or goal.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly this part of Slovakia has interesting position on cultural map of this part of Central Europe. Its marginal position from the social and economical point of view is the matter of serious discussion about poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and Roma policy issues. Cultural content of this region is therefore put a little bit aside. Usually it is



Fig. 11 Lutheran parishes in western Gemer in 1838
Source: Kollár 1838



Fig. 12 Lutheran parishes in western Gemer in 1955
Source: Schematizmus 1955



Fig. 13 Lutheran parishes in western Gemer in 2008
Source: Klátik 2008

generally known that this region has only proud and relatively successful past, but now the future seems uncertain. The situation in religious identity maintenance here at least seems so. There is probably no other region in Slovakia that has undergone that range of changes in all aspects of religious situation. Firstly, quantitative changes indicate gigantic shrinking of locally major Lutheran church with its vast consequences on religious landscape, not exactly residing in changing function of sacred buildings and space, but rather in its continuous devastation and its deserted status. Firstly, associated buildings in ecclesiastical property got devastated (only minority of them has new function) such as schools and parsonages. Here in this region only 4 parsonages are permanently inhabited by a minister, while 60 year ago there were 14 parsonages with permanent minister. The less intensity of common identity session is indicated in the number of worship services per month in each community. Most of the communities have now possibility to gather only once in a month.

Due to social and economical crash that this region is struck, there has been more or less intensive process of depopulation of mostly productive age groups. The average age of the communities is more than 2 years higher than the national mean age. One might think that due to aging of the population, this region would be more religious than average, but here we see totally different processes. This region is old but irreligious at once. This combination makes this region even more interesting and worth to be hereafter researched.

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SUMMARY

Map of cultural identity of Slovakia is full of contrasting areas. Not only from the point of view of ethnicity, but from the point of view of religious identity as well. One of the specific regions is Gemer region in central Slovakia. There is probably no other region with such rapid decline from the economical point of view, but besides large cities (Bratislava and Košice), there is probably no region in Slovakia with such structural changes in the usually stable structure such as religion. The analysis in this paper was focused on western part of this region where mostly mining industry was concentrated, and where the religious structure has probably changed the most. In the mining communities (some of them were populated by incoming miners, usually of different cultural background) there was stronger adherence to communist or at least socio-democratic ideas probably for longer time than anywhere else. This was important factor that activated such cultural and structural changes in religious identity. We have analyzed the impacts of those changes according to the last census in 2001 as well as according to Lutheran church statistical data (as the dominant or mostly only established church in many communities here) about religious services and intensity of the usage of church buildings, especially parsonages.

The changes in religious structure, combined with depopulation (due to economical collapse), has its impact in religious countryside of this region. Firstly, the subsidiary ecclesiastical buildings, such as former church schools and abandoned parsonages started to decay. In most communities and parishes also churches started to decay demonstrating its need to renovate, but mostly from non-church resources (state subsidies) emerged in last decays.

DISTRIBUTION OF ADVENTISTS AND MORMONS IN MODERN EUROPE

Daniel REEVES

Abstract: *The Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints share a number of characteristics (for instance their time and place of origin) making them interesting subjects for geographic comparison. Europe, which has been subject to processes of secularization, since the industrial era, on the one hand, and which can be considered a primary source of American culture during the 19th century, provides an interesting context for such comparisons. This article examines the distribution of Adventists and Mormons in Europe by country and attempts to identify historical factors and organizational characteristics that aid in explaining the respective churches' spatial distributions.*

Keywords*: Adventists, diffusion, Europe, Geography of religion, Mormons*

INTRODUCTION

Since the industrial revolution, the European religious landscape has been subject to significant secularization trends. While these general trends have lent considerable support to secularization theory, a variety of counter movements, especially in recent decades, have caused many social scientists to second guess secularization, as they examine the ongoing influences of religious practices and institutions in modern societies (Henkel 2006). In Europe, these counter movements include an ever-increasing variety of belief systems, from young and vibrant Christian churches to traditional religions from other areas, such as Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism, to various modern or repackaged philosophies.

The Seventh-day Adventist Church (Adventists) and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) represent two dynamic Christian groups that have experienced substantial growth in Europe, since being established in nineteenth-century America. A number of similarities between the two churches, including their emphasis on evangelizing or proselyting, as a means of actively increasing church membership, provide the backdrop for the inter-church comparisons presented here. Moreover, this article's focus on Europe, which can be considered the primary source of cultural heritage – including religious heritage – for the United States during the nineteenth century (the point of origin for Adventism and Mormonism), provides an interesting spatial context for such comparisons.

This research seeks to examine and compare the current distribution of Adventists and Mormons in Europe, at a national level. Specifically, I intend to answer the following questions. 1) How have Adventism and Mormonism, respectively, spread into Europe and how do spatial distributions of Adventists and Mormons in Europe compare? 2) What denominational characteristics and historical developments help in explaining potential differences in the European diffusion of Adventism and Mormonism?

Mgr. Daniel Reeves
Charles University, Department of Social Geography and Regional Development, Albertov 6, Praha 2, 128 43, Česká Republika, phone: +420 774 969 082, e-mail: danvreeves@gmail.com

Literature review

Although often overlooked by social scientists, religion has played and continues to play significant roles in societies throughout the world. As Kong (2001, p 212) states: "In many instances, in the same breath that race, class and gender are invariably invoked and studied as ways by which societies are fractured, religion is forgotten or conflated with race." Religion not only merits inclusion as a criterion for understanding social relations and societies, in general; its omission as an 'axis of identity' along with race, class, nationality and gender is a mistake (Brace, Bailey and Harvey 2006). Kong (2001) goes on to provide a detailed and organized review of geographical research on religion in the 1990s. She frames her review around "politics and poetics in modernity," demonstrating how religion impacts societies and individuals in both secular (political) and spiritual (poetic) ways.

Iannaccone (1997) proposes using rational choice theory as a "framework for the scientific study of religion". He develops the rationale of this framework by perceiving a religious "market", in which various religious organizations and movements present their ideological and spiritual "products" to consumers – the general public. Iannaccone's rational choice framework rests on three distinct assumptions:

- **"Assumption 1:** Individuals act rationally, weighing the costs and benefits of potential actions, and choosing those actions that maximize their net benefits.
- **"Assumption 2:** The ultimate preferences (or 'needs') that individuals use to assess costs and benefits tend not to vary much from person to person or time to time.
- **"Assumption 3:** Social outcomes constitute the equilibria that emerge from the aggregation and interaction of individual actions." (Iannaccone 1997, p 26)

I must admit that, as a religious individual, I struggled initially with the idea of applying economic theory to religion and that I still disagree with the underlying philosophy of such an application, which seems to ignore both the existence and importance of divine truth. Rational choice theory also overlooks or minimizes significant personal influences such as family or societal traditions, reluctance to change and any potential social costs accompanying a change in religious affiliation. However, with these shortcomings in mind, the framework provides a foundation for investigating certain aspects of religious participation. Iannaccone's framework is useful, for instance, in attempting to explain the growth and diffusion of religious movements (i.e. by allowing them to be viewed as products or innovations in a religious market) or in describing the effects of competition among churches for new members (religious consumers). (Iannaccone 1997, see also Iannaccone 1998, Iannaccone and Stark 1997)

Otterstrom has conducted in-depth research on the diffusion of Mormonism throughout the world (1994) as well as on recent developments concerning the Mormon population within the United States of America (2008). He discusses the growth and international development of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in great detail with strong theoretical and methodological frameworks. His work on worldwide Mormon diffusion highlights increasing growth in developing areas and among groups in challenging economic circumstances (Otterstrom 1994). Focusing on the USA, Otterstrom (2008) demonstrates that, from 1990 to 2004, more rapid growth of Mormonism occurred in the central and eastern United States than in the American West, where it could be said that the market is more saturated.

While I found many references to Mormons and numerous articles focusing partially or entirely on the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (e.g. Dunn 1996, McBride 2007, Iannaccone and Stark 1997, Otterstrom 1994 and 2008), I was not as successful in finding articles focusing entirely or even partially on Adventists or the Seventh-day Adventist Church, with the exception of an article on the Adventists' NEW START Program, which included additional references to articles concerning the health benefits of the Adventist lifestyle (Slavíček et al. 2008).[1] I suspect that this apparent increased availability of social science research on Mormons is due, in part, to the churches' relative sizes in North America, where Mormons outnumber Adventists by more than five to one, and, in part, to the existence of a distinct Mormon culture region in the western United States (see Warf and Winsberg 2008; Zelinsky 2001).

A closer look at Adventists and Mormons

The Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints exhibit a number of similarities that make comparison of the two organizations both meaningful and interesting. In terms of worldwide membership in 2007 and the place and time of their origin (see table 1), the churches, indeed, appear very similar. As self-proclaimed Christian churches, Adventists and Mormons also share similar views concerning a number of fundamental beliefs and practices, such as baptism by immersion, only after a candidate has reached a recognizable "age of accountability" (8 years old for Mormons, 12 – 15 for Adventists). Both churches place strong emphasis on maintaining a healthy lifestyle and on strengthening marital and family relations, as well as on sharing their beliefs with others through active evangelizing and missionary programs.

In his book *Nová náboženská hnutí a jak jim porozumět [New religious movements and how to comprehend them]*, author Zdeněk Vojtíšek (2007), a researcher whose areas of expertise include new religious movements and the Czech religious scene, describes both of these churches as representative of a so-called "Christianity of the last days." This is one of three broad divisions that Vojtíšek makes among newer, Protestant Christian churches (the other two divisions are Pentecostal churches and radical new Christian movements). Churches in this "Christianity of the last days" category are characterized by an independence from previously established churches and a focus on preparing for Jesus Christ's return to the earth, as prophesied in scripture (Vojtíšek 2007).

Table 1: Summary of significant similarities between the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saint

	Seventh-day Adventist Church	**Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints**
Place of establishment	New Hampshire, New York, Vermont and Michigan, USA	New York, USA
Time of establishment	1831 - 1863	1820 - 1830
Worldwide membership 2007	15,660,347*	13,193,999**

** 145th Annual Statistical Report – 2007.*

***Statistical Report: 178th Annual General Conference*

1 The NEW START Program outlines Adventist practices concerning physical and spiritual health and, according to this article, can effectively reduce the risks of cardio-vascular disease (Slavíček et al. 2008)

Whether in terms of the Adventist position, advocating a return to thoroughly studying and correctly understanding the Bible as well as their unique role as the "remnant church", or through Mormon claims of a "divine restoration of truth", both churches view themselves as the only existing fellowship of *true* followers of Jesus Christ. Over the years, Adventists and Mormons have moderated their positions slightly and both churches are now quick to recognize and respect the good wrought by and the true principles (according to their respective beliefs) taught by other religious groups, particularly other Christian churches (see www.adventist.org and www.lds.org).

A closer look at the doctrinal beliefs of these churches (e.g. Rosten 1963) reveals that both are indeed not only looking forward to the second coming of Jesus Christ, but also seeking to prepare the world and its inhabitants for this event, by sharing their respective messages and seeking new converts. Understanding the history and development of the missionary efforts – and successes – of Adventists and Mormons as well as the churches' similar beginnings (in terms of time and place), in nineteenth-century America, is fundamental in evaluating and explaining the distribution of Adventists and Mormons in modern-day Europe. I will continue by chronologically (Mormons first) describing the origins of the two churches in question. Details concerning missionary efforts and successes will appear, later, alongside data on contemporary European distributions of Adventists and Mormons.

THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS

In 1820, religious excitement had reached a fever pitch in rural New York, in an area and time period later described as the "burned-over district," in reference to the way a surprising variety of religious revivals swept through the area and excited its inhabitants (Cross 1950). Joseph Smith, Jr., 14 years old at the time, described the religious excitement as follows:

> "Some time in the second year after our removal to Manchester, there was in the place where we lived an unusual excitement on the subject of religion. It commenced with the Methodists, but soon became general among all the sects in that region of country. Indeed, the whole district of country seemed affected by it, and great multitudes united themselves to the different religious parties, which created no small stir and division amongst the people, some crying, 'Lo, here!' and others, 'Lo, there!' Some were contending for the Methodist faith, some for the Presbyterian, and some for the Baptist.
>
> "My mind at times was greatly excited, the cry and tumult were so great and incessant. The Presbyterians were most decided against the Baptists and Methodists, and used all the powers of both reason and sophistry to prove their errors, or, at least, to make the people think they were in error. On the other hand, the Baptists and Methodists in their turn were equally zealous in endeavoring to establish their own tenets and disprove all others (*The Pearl of Great Price*, p. 48)."

Shortly thereafter, Joseph Smith prayed to ask God for direction, concerning which church was the correct one. According to Smith's story and according to the doctrine of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, God the Father and Jesus Christ visited Smith, in a forested area near Palmyra, New York, and called him to be a prophet. They instructed Smith, through many additional revelations, on how to organize, or according to

Mormon doctrine: how to restore, the Church of Jesus Christ for a final dispensation that would precede Christ's second coming. Mormons also believe that God instructed Joseph Smith on where to find an ancient record – written on thin metal plates – of a people who lived in the Americas from about 600 B.C. to approximately 400 A.D. These people, who according to Mormon tradition are ancestors both to American Indians and Pacific Islanders, worshipped God in accordance with Jewish traditions before the time of Christ and as Christians afterwards. This record has been published as *The Book of Mormon: Another Testament of Jesus Christ* and Mormons view it as an additional book of scripture, in essence, an equal companion to the *Bible*.

The Book of Mormon was first published in 1827 and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was officially organized with six members on 6 April 1830, in Fayette, New York.

THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH

The Adventist movement has its roots in the 1830s and 1840s, mainly in New Hampshire and upstate New York. Preachers and ministers from several contemporary, Christian churches contributed to the emergence of the Seventh-day Adventist Church as we know it today. They rallied around theological ideas, surrounding the imminent return of Jesus Christ ("the literal soon advent of Christ") to the earth and the importance of studying and comprehending the Bible. (http://www.adventist.org/world_church/facts_and_figures/history/index.html.en)

One of the central figures in Adventism's "genesis" story is William Miller. Miller, a veteran of the War of 1812, began to study the Bible in depth to put to rest certain concerns he had with what others called contradictions within the Bible itself. Eventually, he resolved all of his concerns and in doing so became very interested in Biblical prophesies, specifically from Old Testament prophet Daniel, concerning Christ's return to the earth. He spent considerable time calculating the date of Jesus Christ's "second coming." His friends became interested in his studies and encouraged him to preach and proclaim this message to others. Miller began preaching in 1831 and with the help of Joshua Himes, a preacher who acted as something of a public relations specialist, he soon generated a following, known as Millerites. The Millerites enthusiastically expected Jesus Christ to return to earth in glory, sometime during 1843. This expected time of arrival was later adjusted to the Spring of 1844 and finally to October 22, 1844. (Vandeman 1986; see also: http://www.whiteestate.org/pathways/pioneers.asp)

A "great disappointment" resulted when Jesus Christ did not return to earth and the Millerites along with other Adventists (at this time, a general term for believers from many faiths including Baptists, Presbyterians, etc.) returned to diligently studying the Bible and preparing for Christ's return, without necessarily setting a date for this anticipated event. The preachers and members of several congregations – mainly from various Baptist churches and the Christian Connection Church – continued calling themselves "Adventist" and by 1863, when the Seventh-day Adventist Church was officially organized, it included approximately 3,500 members and 125 churches. (http://www.adventist.org/world_church/facts_and_figures/history/index.html.en)

Ellen White, whom Adventists recognize as one who had a prophetic gift, was another important figure in the development of Adventism. White attended William

Miller's sermons and became converted to the principles he advocated. After the great disappointment discussed above, she played a significant leadership role in keeping the Adventist movement alive. In particular, White was a central figure in the decision to worship on Saturday and not Sunday. Similar to Mormon prophet Joseph Smith, Ellen White also claimed to receive special communications from God for a larger community of believers. She wrote many books, focusing special attention on health and harmony in life, principles that are fundamental to modern Adventism. (http://www.whiteestate.org)

METHODS AND DISCOVERIES

In light of the similar beginnings described above – especially, in terms of time and location – and based on the rational choice theory of economics, as applied to religious organizations (Iannaccone 1998), I propose a null hypothesis:

- All other factors being equal, it is supposed that the current distribution of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Europe – the result of processes of diffusion of the religious "product" of the respective churches – will be identical.

I realize that such a hypothesis seems more than a little absurd and I intentionally include the words "all other factors being equal", knowing that such is not the case. The "religious products" of the respective churches differ, as do the personalities, attitudes and preferences both of those sharing these products and any who would potentially receive them. Nonetheless, this null hypothesis provides a basis for further examination of European distributions of Adventists and Mormons. A significant portion of the explanation of the data presented shall focus on the reality that "all other factors" are not equal and that strong personalities, leaders, administrative decisions and societal attitudes, among other factors, have played and continue to play important roles in the diffusion of Adventism and Mormonism.

Using membership data for 2007, provided by the Adventist and Mormon churches themselves, and population estimates for 2007 from the World CIA Factbook, I have prepared cartograms and analyzed spatial patterns in the European distributions of Adventists and Mormons, at a national level[2]. I must point out here that membership data reported by the churches themselves could be subject to certain incompatibilities or even inaccuracies. For instance, the churches will likely have different methods for defining membership, for tracking participation and for removing those, who have died or who otherwise no longer participate or identify themselves with the church in question, from their membership totals. Nonetheless, both the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints keep and publicize detailed annual reports on their membership and, keeping the possible shortcomings mentioned in mind, they enable one to make interesting comparisons at a variety of regional and global scales.

ADVENTISTS IN THE EAST

Figure 1 depicts the spatial distribution of Adventists by country across Europe. The background layer displays Europe's countries, divided into quantiles (meaning that there

2 Due to significant cultural differences, I have not included the Caucasus countries in this research, so Europe, as used in this article, shall not include the Caucasus region.

should be an equal number of countries – approx. eight – in each of the five categories), on the basis of the portion of each country's population which is Adventist. The foreground circles display the absolute number of Adventists in the various countries of Europe. High percentages (expressed here as per mille) and high numbers of Adventists are found, particularly, in Romania, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. Western Europe is home to relatively fewer Adventists and a general east-to-west trend is evident, with higher percentages of Adventists in the East and gradually lower percentages – with exceptions – in the West.



Figure 1: Distribution of Adventists in Europe by country 2007
(source: 145th Annual Statistical report-2007 and the CIA World Factbook)

Table 2 presents basic data concerning the five largest populations of Adventists in European countries. As mentioned, the largest three Adventist populations are located in Eastern Europe and, with the exception of Romania and Ukraine, all of the countries on this list rank among the top five in Europe in terms of overall population (Ukraine ranks sixth in overall population, Romania ninth).

Table 2: Largest national populations of Adventists in Europe 2007

COUNTRY	Adventists	‰ Adventist [(Adventists/total population) * 1000]	Rank within Europe in terms of total population
Romania	68860	3.091	9th
Ukraine	61151	1.321	6th
Russia	51875	0.367	1st
Germany	35925	0.436	2nd
United Kingdom	27902	0.459	4th

Source: 145th Annual Statistical Report – 2007.

The strong presence and activity of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Romania, Moldova and Ukraine appears to support the idea that Adventist missionary efforts are successful and, consequently, seem to focus on populations and groups that need humanitarian assistance. For 2007, the CIA World Fact Book listed these three countries among the lowest in Europe in terms of GDP per capita. Moldova was the absolute lowest in Europe, ranking 125th in the world, while Ukraine, at 88th in the world, was second lowest (excluding the Caucasus Mountain states) and Romania exhibited Europe's seventh lowest GDP per capita (again, excluding the Caucasus Mountain states) with a world ranking of 71.[3]

The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA, see www.adra.org) is the Seventh-day Adventist Church's flagship organization in providing humanitarian assistance. ADRA is a modern manifestation of the church's history of offering aid and education to diverse populations (see also Reeves 2009). With a simple Google search, I found a number of ADRA projects that focused on Romania and Ukraine, in recent years. An Adventist youth group from Scotland, for example, has made multiple trips to Romania during summer vacations to build houses for impoverished families (http://www.sdascotland.com/main/). Another Adventist group, this one from Moravia in Czechia, recently completed a project entitled *Úsměv pro Ukrajinu [A Smile for Ukraine]*. The project focused on the region along the Romania-Ukraine border and included general repairs to a local school and a variety of other acts of service. (http://www.dcvm.cz/archiv/ukrajina-rumunsko07.htm)

In addition to its focus on humanitarian service and perhaps more significantly, in terms of the comparisons in this article, the Seventh-day Adventist Church also has a long history in Eastern Europe. Adventist missionaries entered Romania in 1868 and Ukraine in 1886 (Land 2005). In Romania, there were enough Adventists, by 1928, that the Romanian Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists received state recognition. At the beginning of World War II, there were about 13,000 Adventists in Romania. This created a strong

3 These values and rankings differ significantly depending on what organization gathered the information. Wikipedia.org has a nice comparison of IMF, World Bank and CIA data on GDP per capita (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_European_countries_by_GDP_per_capita).

enough base that the church was able to continue its activities – with restrictions – through four decades of communist control, entering the 1990s with a foundation and momentum to support further post-socialist growth. Romania is the clearest example of a larger trend of Adventist missionary success in Eastern Europe.

In fact, the relatively strong presence of Adventists (especially in comparison with Mormons) in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe previous to World War II and subsequent communist revolutions, resulting in the establishment of the Iron Curtain, is quite possibly the single most important factor in explaining the divergent distributions of Adventists and Mormons in modern Europe (see below). The various communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact were all, to varying degrees, against organized religion. They actively prevented the spreading of religious ideas and even outlawed the activities of many religious organizations. This was, perhaps, most clearly evident in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which for a period of four years (1952-1956) banned all activities of the Seventh-day Adventist Church (Drejnar 2008). The primary reason that this ban did not last longer was the realization that Adventists continued to meet in secret and that it was better for the regime to be able to control the church's activities in the context of some official status.

In contrast, the activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Czechoslovakia were made illegal, in 1950, for the duration of the communist period (until 1990) (Reeves 2004, Mehr 1994). This example is typical of the manner, in which other communist countries dealt with their Mormon populations (which, if such populations existed, were generally very small, i.e. less than 300 in Czechoslovakia) (Mehr 2002). Mormons behind the Iron Curtain enjoyed the best conditions, in terms of government recognition and allowance in East Germany, where the largest Mormon congregations of all Soviet Bloc countries were located (Mehr 2002).

MORMONS IN THE WEST

As I have begun to indicate, the distribution of Mormons in Europe differs significantly from that of Adventists. The United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain stand out in figure 2, which displays relative and absolute numbers of Mormons in European country populations. A general west to east trend of higher to lower population ratios is visible, supporting the idea of a concentric distribution of Mormons centered on the American West (Reeves 2009). The United Kingdom is nearly eclipsed by the circle, representing its more than 180 thousand Mormons. A small circle representing Mormons, living on the Isle of Man, is even visible near the center of this large circle.

Similar to table 1 above, table 3 lists the five largest national Mormon populations in Europe. Spain and Portugal stand out from this list with lower European rankings (seventh and twelfth respectively), in terms of overall population. Portugal and the United Kingdom have very high portions – in a European context – of Mormons in their respective populations. It is clear that Mormons are more firmly established in Western Europe than they are in the East and, as with the Adventists, we can, at least partially, explain this distribution on the basis of historical events, policies and missionary successes.



Figure 2: Distribution of Mormons in Europe by country 2007
(source: www.newsroom.lds.org and the CIA World Factbook)

Table 3: Largest national populations of Mormons in Europe 2007

COUNTRY	Mormons	‰ Mormon [(Adventists/total population) * 1000]	Rank within Europe in terms of total population
United Kingdom	181756	2.991	4th
Spain	42873	1.060	7th
Portugal	38100	3.580	12th
Germany	37159	0.451	2nd
France	34638	0.558	3rd

Source: www.newsroom.lds.org

The earliest missionary efforts of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints focused on the United States and the British Isles and Mormon missionary work soon expanded into other parts of Europe; however, during these early years the message of Mormonism included a call to "gather to Zion." With a doctrine-based practice that lends itself to comparison with Jewish Zionism, new converts to the Church of Jesus Christ were encouraged to immigrate to the United States to join with other Mormons in building a "New Jerusalem" on the American Continent (The Articles of Faith, No. 10). This practice, which was officially discontinued in 1911, played a significant role in Mormon history and in the church's subsequent development and diffusion (*Our Heritage: A Brief History of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* 1996).

Mormon missionaries arrived in England in 1837 and by 1850 they had also entered Scandinavia, France and Germany. These missionaries found success, particularly in England, but, for several decades to follow, a large portion of Mormon converts emigrated to join with the Mormons in America (*Our Heritage* 1996). There are estimates that more than 100,000 Mormons emigrated from the United Kingdom to America from 1837 to 1900. In 1870, British immigrants accounted for nearly half of the population of Utah (www.newsroom.lds.org). As noted above, this call to migrate to "Zion" was officially ended in 1911; from that time on, Mormons have been encouraged, in a general sense, to remain where they are and to build up and support their local church communities. As a result, numbers of Mormons in the United Kingdom and elsewhere have increased more consistently, over the last century.

The organizational structure of these two churches constitutes another important factor that can help in explaining the distributions of Adventists and Mormons in Europe. From my own observations, it appears that Adventist congregations in Czechia have relatively more local autonomy (i.e. less centrally applied leadership) than comparable congregations of Mormons in Czechia. This higher degree of local autonomy – expressed primarily through less emphasis on vertical communication and coordination within the organization – could help explain the more globally dispersed and less-concentric distribution of Adventists, in comparison with the distribution of Mormons.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, on the other hand, is characterized by a centralized organizational scheme, with a structured hierarchy leading up to the president of the church, who along with his two counselors, comprise the First Presidency. According to Mormon beliefs, the president of the church is a prophet, receiving guidance and inspiration, concerning how to direct the Church of Jesus Christ, from Christ himself. In addition to these three men (the First Presidency), Mormons look to a Quorum of Twelve Apostles – twelve other men, "called" by inspiration to serve as Apostles until they die – for what they view as inspired leadership for the entire world. Moving down the vertical structure, Mormons also receive guidance from five Quorums of "Seventies" – general and regional authorities – and, ultimately, from local leaders.

In addition to this, the Mormon missionary program creates an extensive network for enforcing societal (church-wide) norms and practices. Young Mormons, primarily between the ages of 19 and 25 years of age, are strongly encouraged to serve as full-time missionaries. Interested, eligible individuals fill in a paper application and go through an interview process with local Mormon leaders. Application materials are then sent to church headquarters in Salt Lake City and within a matter of weeks a "mission call" is issued. In

1997, for example, I completed this process and received a "mission call" to serve for two years in the Czech Prague Mission, which includes all of Czechia and Slovakia. Mormon missionaries always work in pairs and wear black nametags. Their primary objective is provide others with an opportunity to learn about the "message of the restoration", which in essence is based upon Joseph Smith's role as a "modern prophet", the Book of Mormon as a book of scripture and the existence of a living prophet today. These missionaries generally serve for eighteen months or two years and pay their own way.

Among other things, this organization means that significant vertical and horizontal relations exist to monitor both compliance with central directives and consistency concerning the doctrines and practices emphasized throughout the global Mormon organization. The church's missionary program facilitates ongoing exchanges and interactions between lay members and full-time missionaries from diverse parts of the world (especially from areas that are home to many Mormons, i.e. North and South America), further encouraging feelings of cross-cultural unity and consistent group practices and behaviors. It is clear that these two additional characteristics of the Mormon faith – its central organization scheme and its missionary program – contribute to a high degree of acculturation, which can help explain the church's appeal, i.e. its higher rate of acceptance, in societies that are more culturally similar to the United States.

This can be seen in Europe, especially, in the high numbers of Mormons living in the United Kingdom, to a lesser degree, in Portugal and Spain (linguistic and cultural ties to South America), and more generally in the concentration of European Mormons in the West.

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISONS

Direct comparison of Adventists and Mormons in Europe yields additional interesting results. Aggregate data for all of Europe show that there are more Mormons (458,979) in the continent than Adventists (383,114). This difference becomes more significant when the overall numbers are normalized by the churches' total membership numbers: 3.5% of all Mormons live in Europe compared with 2.4% of all Adventists (145th Annual Statistical report-2007, www.newsroom.lds.org). In light of the cultural similarities between Europe and North America, this statistic supports the notion that Mormonism embodies a stronger cultural component than Adventism.

Figure 3 presents some direct comparisons between Adventists and Mormons in Europe. The vertical bars depict the absolute numbers of Adventists and Mormons by country (countries with less than 100,000 inhabitants are not depicted in this way). The background layer of figure 3 has been computed to show the relative dominance of one or the other of the two churches in question. I first normalized all of the national membership data by the total worldwide membership of the respective churches (in essence 1 Mormon = 1/13,193,999 and 1 Adventist = 1/15,660,347) and then calculated a ratio of the *weighted Mormon population: weighted Adventist population* for each country in Europe. I removed countries with very small total populations, which had representatives from one church and not the other (e.g. Faroe Islands, Isle of Man, etc.). The remaining countries are represented in modified quantiles with significant ratio values at 0.8 or 1.2 and at 0.284 or 3.5. This means that a country falling into the "Adventist" category has between 1.2 and 3.5 times the significance in terms of Adventist population within the Seventh-

day Adventist Church in comparison with the same country's Mormon population within the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, whereas the Adventist populations of countries labeled "Dominant Adventist" have at least 3.5 times the relative significance of the same countries' Mormon populations.

The composite information presented in figure 3 highlights the East-West gradient of Adventist-Mormon membership more than either of the preceding single church distributions (figures 1 and 2). It appears that the Mormons' slower start in spreading into Eastern Europe, primarily as a result of Mormon Zionism and the church's organizational characteristics (e.g. slower implementation of missionary program from above – vertical structure; distinct Mormon culture and associated processes of acculturation), put the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints at a disadvantage, when compared with the Seventh-day Adventist Church. In contrast, Adventists, who were quicker and more successful at establishing themselves in Eastern Europe, previous to World War II and subsequent political changes, weathered decades of communist rule and emerged with traditions and a foundation to support continued growth.



Figure 3: Comparison of Adventist and Mormon presence in Europe in 2007
(*source: 145th Annual Statistical report-2007, www.newsroom.lds.org and the CIA World Factbook)*

CONCLUSION

It is clear that the simplistic null-hypothesis that I proposed above can be rejected. Significant regional differences exist, both in the distribution of Adventists and Mormons throughout Europe, as well as in the portions of adherents to the two churches in diverse countries and regions. Historic developments, including church policies and the initial entrance of missionaries into various European countries, are helpful in explaining the distributions of the two churches in question and it appears that path dependence – in this case, the length of time that a church has been firmly established in a country – is one of the more significant factors in the diffusion of Adventists and Mormons, respectively. Another important factor is the unique structures of the respective Adventist and Mormon religious organizations. According to my observations, Adventist congregations have more local autonomy than their Mormon counterparts, which are, on the other hand, subject to a stricter enforcement of societal norms, typical of a centrally controlled organization. This translates to the higher degree of acculturation required of converts to Mormonism – again, according to my observations – which could play a role in explaining the relatively denser concentrations of Mormons in countries that are more culturally similar to North America.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that, while these findings are interesting and descriptive in portraying aspects of the geography of religion in Europe, there are many latent factors involved in the diffusion of a "religious product" that lie beyond the scope of this article and, perhaps, beyond the reach of any attempts to describe or measure such factors. The personal circumstances, attitudes and perceived spiritual needs, both of Adventists and Mormons sharing their views on Christianity and any who would potentially embrace such views and join either of the churches, differ significantly from person to person. This study provides a generalized look at the distribution of two dynamically-growing, young, Christian churches in Europe and attempts to explain some of the reasons behind the apparent spatial differences.

Adventists and Mormons are two small groups that are representative of a larger trend of diversified sacralization in post-modern Europe. Secularization processes, which had arguably progressed furthest in Europe, are now being contested, although at a smaller scale, by modern trends of increasing and diversifying religiosity. Current increases in religiosity in Europe are primarily centered on local church communities, including young Christian churches and ancient religions from other world regions (e.g. Havlíček, Hupková 2008). Although these trends are often, and appropriately, linked with migration to Europe from less-developed countries, in many cases they involve native Europeans. In all cases, such sacralization trends impact local European cultures and societies and merit attention from social scientists. Further research into the spatial patterns of religion, including issues of religious identity and cultural practices in daily life, will certainly yield interesting and important results, helping us to better understand the interdependencies of religion, culture and identity in the post-modern era.

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SUMMARY

The Seventh-day Adventist Church (Adventists) and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) represent two dynamic Christian groups that have experienced substantial growth in Europe, since being established in nineteenth-century America. A number of similarities between the two churches, including their emphasis on evangelizing or proselyting, as a means of actively increasing church membership, provide the backdrop for the inter-church comparisons presented here. Moreover, this article's focus on Europe, which can be considered the primary source of cultural heritage – including religious heritage – for the United States during the nineteenth century (the point of origin for Adventism and Mormonism), provides an interesting spatial context for such comparisons.

This research seeks to examine and compare the current distribution of Adventists and Mormons in Europe, at a national level. Specifically, I intend to answer the following questions. 1) How have Adventism and Mormonism, respectively, spread into Europe and how do spatial distributions of Adventists and Mormons in Europe compare? 2) What denominational characteristics and historical developments help in explaining potential differences in the European diffusion of Adventism and Mormonism?

On the basis of a null hypothesis: *All other factors being equal, it is supposed that the current distribution of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Europe – the result of processes of diffusion of the religious "product" of the respective churches – will be identical*, significant regional differences are confirmed to exist, both in the distribution of Adventists and Mormons throughout Europe, as well as in the portions of adherents to the two churches in diverse countries and regions. Historic developments, including church policies and the initial entrance of missionaries into various European countries, are helpful in explaining the distributions of the two churches in question and it appears that path dependence – in this case, the length of time that a church has been firmly established in a country – is one of the more significant factors in the diffusion of Adventists and Mormons, respectively. Another important factor is the unique structures of the respective Adventist and Mormon religious organizations. According to my observations, Adventist congregations have more local autonomy than their Mormon counterparts, which are, on the other hand, subject to a stricter enforcement of societal norms, typical of a centrally controlled organization. This translates to the higher degree of acculturation required of converts to Mormonism – again, according to my observations – which could play a role in explaining the relatively denser concentrations of Mormons in countries that are more culturally similar to North America.

GLOBAL CRISIS – AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COMPLETION OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF SLOVENIAN ECONOMY

Lučka LORBER

Abstract: *Until the middle of 1991, Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav political and economic situation was different from the traditional political and economic order of other east block countries. In the 1980s, economic problems began mounting, because the east block countries, including Yugoslavia, no longer received financial help from developed countries and had to pay back loans.*

After 1991, Slovenia's economy began changing to market economy and the privatisation process was started. It was clear from the GDP structure and GVA of Slovenian economic sectors that their economy had structural problems.

During the accession process, the new Slovenian state had to form its statehood and adapt its legislation to the European. At the same time, it had to transform the economy and secure social peace. Structural social and economic changes proceeded relatively slowly because the Slovenian government decided on a step-by-step policy with gradual changes aimed at market economy, secure national economy and clearly defined national interests.

Slovenia, contrary to the rest of the transition countries, maintained its controlling share in the ownership structure of the largest banks. This is the reason why Slovenia never felt the immediate consequences of the global financial crash to such large extent. However, the disturbances in the capital market due to the enormous loans for management (leverage) buyout of large Slovenian companies constitute a problem.

Key words: *global recession, Slovenia, structural transformation of economy, public – private partnership, regional disparities.*

INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War the political East-West division of Europe was a serious obstacle to common political and economic development of the continent.

Until the middle of 1991, Slovenia was a part of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav political and economic situation was different from the traditional political and economic order of other Eastern Bloc countries. According to the Yalta doctrine on the post-war world, Yugoslavia was evenly influenced politically by each of the two blocks. Despite communist rule, the Yugoslav post-war authority had created its own path into socialism that was more humane and economically more effective compared to other countries of the Eastern Bloc.

Slovenia, being the most developed region of Yugoslavia, had had its specific development also because of the relative autonomy of the Yugoslav republics. Slovenia's

Assistant Professor Lučka Lorber, Ph.D.
Department of Geography, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor, Koroška 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia, e-mail: lucka.lorber@uni-mb.si

population accounted for 8% of the Yugoslav population. Slovenia's GDP exceeded Yugoslav GDP for 17% and Slovenian companies accounted for more that 28% of the total country's export, especially to West European countries.

In the 1980s, economic problems began mounting, because the east block countries, including Yugoslavia, no longer received financial help from developed countries and had to pay back loans. That is why the Slovenian authority decided to introduce economic changes to protect Slovenia's economy.



	Serbia	Slovenia	Croatia	Bosnia	Montenegro	Macedonia
Number of citizens	9.226	1982	4784	4364	642	2021
GDP/Billion of USD	27.910	13.740	25.640	10.870	1.520	4.420
GDP/USD per capita	3.025	6.940	5350	2.490	2.330	2.180

Graph 1*:* Yugoslav republics, year 1990.
Source:Eurostat, SURS

In 1989, the situation suddenly changed. The process of spatial European integration began, despite cultural, political and economic differences of European countries. The geographical and cultural consciousness of Western Europe must move eastward. European unification is more than just an adjustment of the East to the West. The historical experiences and cultural richness of the new member states will have considerable impacts on the societies in the West. The enlargement must for long-term sustainability not be reduced to merely a political and economic project. If the enlargement is not also made to a cultural project a mental wall will persist where iron curtain once existed (Stråth, 2003).

The accession of new member states to the European Union in 2004 represented the biggest ever enlargement of the European Union in terms of population (19 percent) and area (22 percent), but a smaller increase in terms of economic output (9 percent). Romania and Bulgaria joined to the EU in 2007. For all these postsocialist countries (exception Cyprus and Malta), EU membership represented a major milestone in their transformation to market-based economies.



	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovak Republic	Slovenia
— - 1997-2000	-0,1	6,0	4,5	5,5	4,8	5,5	3,4	4,7
—— 2000-2003	2,9	8,1	4,4	7,2	7,0	2,7	3,7	3,5
- - 2004-2008	5,3	6,0	2,9	7,4	7,0	5,4	7,4	5,0

Graph 2. Boost to growth, 1997-2000, 2000-2003, 2004-2008
Source: EBRD, Eurostat, SURS.

Increased economic integration and successful reforms fostered faster than expected growth in the new member states. In Slovenia, spatial integration into EU has taken place by adjusting to European legal and economic order aiming at successful restructuring of economic activities and achieved economic weight, comparable to average economic growth of EU- 27.

This rapid growth allowed the new EU countries to increase their share in global economic output. Greater access to western markets led to a rapid rise in exports and improved access to foreign financing helped boost consumption.

EU membership has been particularly favourable for Slovenia and Slovakia, which have managed to meet all of the Maastricht criteria and enter the euro monetary area. Slovenia was the first new member state to adopt the euro in January 2007. The country's per capita income in PPS, the highest among the new member states, reached about 91 percent of the EU - 27 average in 2008. The Slovak Republic, the most recent entrant to the euro area, in January 2009, has been one of the strongest economic performers among the new member states, with growth fueled by productivity gains and exports. Together with Slovenia and the Czech Republic, it is now considered an advanced, rather than emerging economy (Čihak, Mitra, 2009).

But the good times didn't last. The global crisis hit in 2007 and deepened in 2008. First, this crisis started in the rich, development world, because it originated in the world's largest economy, will have a much broader and deeper impact.

Second, precisely because this is first and foremost a financial crisis, it has spread rapidly around the entire globe. For the first time since the Second World War, almost all of the major world economies are contracting simultaneously. This makes its impact on small developing countries much more severe since there are no alternative markets to which their exports can easily be directed.

Third, and crucially, the size of the shock is huge. Industrial production has plummeted; several countries are experiencing double digit reductions in their GDP. The sheer size of

the recessions experienced and their rapid transmission around the world ensure that the crash of 2008 will, without question, be the largest financial and economic crisis since 1929 (Mcculloch, Sumner, 2009).

HOW TO ADJUST THE NEW ECONOMIC REALITY?

Slovenian economy faced global crisis rather unprepared given the fact that all economic indicators for the first half of 2008 showed fast and successful growth of national economy. The driving force of development was rapid export growth and intense investment growth, particularly in building sector.

Tab. 1: The main structural indicators for Slovenia compare to EU 27, year 2000 and 2008

	SI		EU - 27	
	2000	2008	2000	2008
GDP per capita in PPS 2006	78,9	90,8	100	100
Labour productivity	75,5	85,0	100	100
Employment rate	62,8	68,6	62,2	64,4
Employment rate of older workers	22,7	32,8	36,9	43,5
Gross domestic expendure on R&D, 2007	1,41	1,53	1,86	1,83
Youth education attainment level, 2007	88,0	91,5	76,6	78,1
Comperative price levels, 2007	72,9	77,8	100	100
Bussiness investment, 2007	23,2	23,8	18,4	18,7
AT-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers, 2007	11,0	12,0*	-	16,0
Long-term unemployment rate	4,1	1,9	4,0	2,6
Total greenhouse gas emissions (1990 =100), 2006	92,6	101,2	90,7	92,3
Energy intensity of the economy (kgoe/1000), 2006	341,9	299,1	213,1	202,5
Volumen of freight transport relative to GDP, 2007	100,0	138,5	100,0	106,8

Source: Eurostat, SURS.

In 2007, GDP growth reached 6.1%; EU-27 (2.9%); employment rate grew by 2.7% (1.6%), labour productivity was higher by 3.3% (1.3%), export increased by 16.8% (6.8%) and comprised 71.4% GDP (40.1%). Unemployment (according to the labour force poll) was at its lowest rate since gaining independence, 4.9% (7.1%), and work activity was at its highest, 56.8% (53.2%).

Among all new Member states, Slovenia was the one to allocate the largest portion of resources for R&D, 1.58% - which was still under the EU-27 average (1.83%). Dynamic economic development and new development perspectives after the entry into the EU reflected also in the increase in birth rate. In 2008, a 10% increase in the number of children born compared to the preceding year and 22% more in comparison to the year 2004.



Graph 3*:* Live births in Slovenia, 1994-2008
Source: SURS

IMPACT OF GLOBAL RECESSION

After the first quarter of 2009, Slovenia entered recession. The reasons for this pace and depth are external as well as internal. The external ones are predominantly a result of the depression in the Slovenia's strongest trading partners, Germany, Italy, France and in access to bank loans made more difficult.

The new EU states' relative success in stabilizing and reforming their economies, combined with their acceptance into the European Union, appears to have contributed to rapid interest rate convergence, even though favourable global conditions—low interest rates, ample liquidity, and a widening of the investor base for emerging markets—also played a role. This spurred massive capital inflows to the new member states, in the form of direct investment, bank loans, and portfolio investment.

The share of foreign ownership in the banking systems of NMS is higher than in advanced Europe and in emerging markets in other parts of the world. A handful of foreign banks, headquartered in advanced Europe, entered the new markets in emerging Europe mainly by acquiring newly privatized banks. These foreign banks currently control a major part of banking assets in the new member states. Slovenia, contrary to the rest of the transition countries, maintained its controlling share in the ownership structure of the largest banks. This is the reason why Slovenia never felt the immediate consequences of the global financial crash to such large extent. However, the disturbances in the capital market due to the enormous loans for management (leverage) buyout of large Slovenian companies constitute a problem. Global financial crisis reflected in rapid fall in the value of overheating shares of the Slovenian public limited companies. The said lead to inability to repay loans insured by shares of the bought companies themselves, which, in turn, affected the liquidity of the Slovenian bank system.



Graph 4*:* The share of foreign ownership in the banking systems of NMS
Source: EBRD

An unexpectedly large fall of GDP is mainly a result of decreasing export. The recession, caused by the global financial crisis in its most important trade partners, lead to a significant fall in production in the processing industries of Slovenian economy. The fall in export began in the second half of 2008 and decreased drastically in 2009.



Graph 5*:* Fall of GDP and beginning of recession
Source: Umar, SURS

The small size of Slovenia's market has always been orienting Slovenia's economy towards export.

At the same time, rapid decrease in export indicates structural inadequacy of export products in relation to the primary production factor.



	Export	Import
Index 01-09/01-08 =	75,2	69,4
Index 02-09/02-08 =	75,9	72,2
Index 03-09/03-08 =	81,4	77,9
Index 04-09/04-08 =	70,2	65,7
Index 05-09/05-08 =	77,9	65,9
Index 06-09/06-08 =	80,5	68,0
Index 1-6-09/1-6-08 =	76,8	69,8
Total 1-6-2008	10.314	11.764
Total 1-6-2009	7.923	8.210
Balance 2008	87,7 %	
Balance 2009	96,5 %	

Graph 6*:* Export and Import from January 2008 to June 2009
Source: SURS

Tab. 2: Structure of goods export according to the primary production factor in Slovenia, EU-15 and EU - 12 between 1995 and 2007, in %.

		1995	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
High natural sources Consumption	SI	16,6	16,6	15,3	15,1	14,6	14,6	14,0	15,4	16,1	15,5
	EU-15	19,6	18,8	18,0	17,5	17,7	17,6	18,2	17,8	19,4	19,3
	EU-12			20,7	19,7	18,8	18,2	18,8	19,2	19,0	18,5
High labour Consumption	SI	25,6	23,0	21,7	21,4	20,1	18,6	17,8	17,0	14,2	12,6
	EU-15	11,8	11,6	10,2	10,3	9,9	9,8	9,3	8,6	8,2	8,1
	EU-12			18,5	18,9	18,8	17,7	15,8	14,0	12,3	11,4
Goods of low Technological Demand	SI	9,7	8,9	9,9	9,8	9,9	10,1	10,8	8,8	10,2	10,4
	EU-15	7,9	7,3	6,7	6,7	6,8	6,9	7,4	6,6	7,1	7,6
	EU-12			10,5	10,9	11,0	11,0	11,5	10,6	10,8	11,1
Goods of medium Technological Demand	SI	31,9	34,5	36,4	36,4	37,5	37,3	38,3	40,2	39,1	40,9
	EU-15	30,4	31,0	29,8	30,3	30,5	30,7	30,8	29,8	29,5	30,2
	EU-12			30,1	30,6	31,5	33,1	33,3	33,3	34,3	35,5
Goods of high Technological demand	SI	14,8	15,7	15,3	15,9	16,5	18,1	17,2	16,0	17,1	17,4
	EU-15	24,3	26,0	29,2	29,1	29,0	28,3	27,9	28,5	28,6	26,5
	EU-12			18,1	17,3	17,9	18,0	18,8	18,2	19,2	19,7

Source: Umar

The Table shows that in this period Slovenia's economy transformed into production with lower energy and labour consumption. Goods of medium technological demand have had highest growth in export.

The decreased export and smaller domestic consumption (slower investment activity) resulted in the fall of industrial production.



Graph 7 *:* The fall of industrial production
Source: SURS

Consequently, structural changes within the production economic sector of the Slovenian economy were not thorough enough despite its enviable performance. Slovenia, as well as the most of the Candidate countries, had a well-developed secondary sector with qualified labour force, though lacking structural trends of developed countries. Manufacture was mainly comprised of labour-intensive traditional industry sectors with low added value.



	D	DA	DB	DC	DD	DE	DF	DG	DH	DI	DJ	DK	DL	DM	DN
Indeks 2006	145,7	99,0	51,1	38,8	79,0	75,6	0,0	238,4	184,4	107,0	151,8	162,1	368,1	187,9	134,1
Indeks 2003	126,0	112,0	69,6	36,9	69,1	73,3	10,5	170,0	147,0	130,0	131,0	131,0	249,0	118,0	128,0

Graph 8: Changes in Manufacture sectors in year 2003 and 2006 (1992 = 100%)
Source: Umar, SURS

During its preparations for the EU accession, Slovenian manufacture was adapting to the new market situation. An analysis of production sectors has shown that the greatest fall occurred in sectors like DB – Manufacture of textiles and textile products, DC – Manufacture of leather and leather products, DD – Manufacture of wood and wood products, and DE – Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products. DL – Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment and DG – Manufacture of chemicals, chemicals products and man-made fibre have reached higher growth. DF – Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel is an exception, because the extreme drop caused by the closing down of the only Slovenian refinery (Lorber 2008b) .

The ongoing global crisis presents an opportunity for a faster, more affective restructuring of the economy. Measures on the EU and national levels alleviate the crisis in the labour market thus enabling preservation of healthy economic cores and stimulate restructuring of labour intensive production activities with lower value added.

Developed manufacturing sectors are the generator of development in service sectors that are associated with the industry. In these service sectors possibilities exist for employing the work force which has once lost their employment in the manufacturing sectors because of the rationalisation of working processes and improved work productivity.

In order to improve the economic situation and successfully implement development programmes, the strategic holders (transportation-logistics sector, financial and business services, tourism, as well as large and small entrepreneurship) of economic development should be properly stimulated. It is in the regional and national interest to take advantage of the favourable geostrategic position and development perspective for the purpose of international cooperation. Public and private investments in education should be enhanced, especially investing in science and new technologies that would, together with investments in entrepreneurship, form a basis for transformation of Slovenian economy.

Tab. 3: Sectoral breakdown of gross value added as share of GDP and Activity

	2007	Gross value added in %, 2007		
	GDP/person	Agriculture	Industry	Service
EU-27	24800	1,9	26,5	71,6
Slovenia	16600	2,0	34,5	63,5
Austria	32800	1,9	31,1	66,9
Hungary	10000	4,2	29,5	66,3
Croatia	8443	6,8	30,2	63,0
Italia	25900	2,0	27,0	70,9

Source: Eurostat, Umar

The restructuring of manufacture from energy- and labour-intense sectors into technologically demanding sectors requires more services. With a higher living standard, the sector of services is developing. There are new job opportunities with higher added

value. All these changes cause differences in the sectors' share of GDP. Agriculture and manufacture are on the decline and services are on the rise.

The state regulative quickly or more slowly coordinated the processes of economic change, which were dictated by the market economy and requirements of the European Union. This was suitably followed by a share of foreign investment, intended particularly for restructuring industrial production and modernisation of technology. The interior political stability of the country and the establishment of a friendly environment mainly influenced the decision of investors (Lorber 2005).

The biggest obstacle in the restructuring of Slovenian economy was capital ownership. Slovenian companies were privatized with the distribution of certificates among citizens that could be invested into companies. Thus, many companies got an internal owner. In more than 60 % of the Slovenian companies the owners are the employees of the company.

However, Slovenia has been less successful in attracting foreign direct investment, while there are delays in the privatisation process, particularly in the banking and insurance sectors.

A higher starting point in development and the traditional orientation of Slovenian economy into foreign markets enabled Slovenia a more controlled and a own-force-and-knowledge- based economic development. This strategic decision meant that some of the NMSs began progressing faster. However, this makes Slovenian economy less affected in the time of global crisis.

THE GLOBAL CRISIS IMPACT ON REGIONAL DISPARITIES

Endogenously devised approach to stimulation of development, based on exploitation of Slovenia's own developmental capabilities, was crucial in that stage of development. However, only local integration on a global level can guarantee greater efficiency of the development by combining international and state funding, as well as by private funding and building of public-private partnerships.

Developmental backwardness of the cohesion region of Vzhodna Slovenija (Eastern Slovenia), in particular according to the socio-economic indicators, inadequate traffic integration of border regions, the undeveloped service sector and the underdevelopment of the public infrastructure prevent faster regional economic synergies.

Diverse economic capacities of individual regions, unfavourable population trends as a consequence of stagnant policy regarding the border regions, incoherent development of the metropolitan areas and non-implementation of the concept of polycentric development all contribute to the setbacks and deviations from the objectives of the European regional development policy. In the border regions that were less interesting for foreign economic investments due to their peripheral location, the European competitiveness policy is now being established within

1995	118,0
1996	118,2
1997	117,9
1998	117,7
1999	119,1
2000	118,0
2001	119,8
2002	119,7
2003	121,0
2004	120,4
2005	120,6
2006	120,2

1995	85,0
1996	84,8
1997	85,0
1998	85,1
1999	84,0
2000	84,6
2001	83,3
2002	83,3
2003	82,2
2004	82,6
2005	82,4
2006	82,7

Fig. 1: Regional disparities NUTS 2the internal EU market.
Source: SURS

Slovenia is progressing in the right direction towards ensuring the conditions for the sustainable development through the accelerated investing in R&D and further high economic growth. The new cohesion division of Slovenia at the NUTS 2 level gives the country the opportunity to draw additional resources from the European development funds.



	2006	2006 GVA in %		
	GDP in EUR/person	Agriculture	Industry	Service
Slovenia	15504	2,0	34,5	63,5
Western Slovenia	18350	1,4	28,1	70,5
Eastern Slovenia	12680	3,6	42,1	54,2

Fig. 2: Regional disparities NUTS 2
Source: SURS

The Slovenian economy embraces the ongoing crisis as an opportunity for a radical structural transformation. Spatial definition of the NUTS 2 regions and defining the role of the institutions in creation of co-existential integration practices with immediate effect on spatial structure and function also have an indirect impact on generating the mechanisms for minimisation of regional disparities within the Slovenian space.

For less developed Eastern Slovenia, global crisis presents an opportunity to accelerate its development plans and, based on new development programmes, direct its development efforts into new forms of economic development, based on knowledge, using natural resources given, interregional association according to the bottom-up planning approach and project management.

CONCLUSIONS

Slovenia has been fulfilling the Lisbon objective within the economic development strategy ever since its entry into the EU. The review of structural indicators, used by Eurostat to measure the efficiency of implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, shows that, according to the Gross Domestic Product per capita and according to the labour productivity per employed person, Slovenia has succeeded in performing the transformation of economy. The structural changes achieved within economic sectors, the analysis of the GDP structure and definition according to the OECD criteria position Slovenia amongst developed countries.

During the transition period, Slovenia never completely submitted to Western policy prescriptions. Contrary to the remaining NMSs, Slovenia preserved a dominating state influence in its banking system and controlled the opening of the economy for foreign investments by making slow and well considered amendments to laws. This, contrary to certain NMSs, resulted in slower pace of economic development compared to after 2004; however, due to the economic development rate which helped it enter the time of transition; its stage of development with which it entered transition,

The recession indicated the need for new global economic paradigm which will consider specific characteristics of developing countries. The hope is that we will see the emergence of development policies which are much more and country sensitive as a result.

The global financial crisis may change the development paradigm – but it is most likely to do so through its impact on the attitudes of developing country policymakers towards the prevailing policy prescriptions, rather than through major structural changes in global economic governance.

The time of recession should be used for implementation of deep structural economic changes which will enable creating and growth of high-quality jobs. In order to do so, flexibility of the labour market and educational reforms will need to be implemented. Missed restructuring of the public sector is supposed to be a future priority for ensuring social cohesion which is the European Union's global advantage in the context of quality of life and development of democracy. By consistent implementation of the European regional integration process and changing priorities regarding European structural resources, a network of European economic power centres will develop, which will be able to reduce regional disparities using their multifunctional influences.

The current crisis, paradoxically, may provide more political space to make these kinds of changes possible, given the widely shared experience of severe economic insecurity by all relevant actors in society.

There is a need to act, even if it requires questioning conventional wisdom in such central aspects as the role of the state and the market in postcrisis conditions.

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